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TRADE CONTRACTION AND ECONOMIC REGRESSION. 
THE AGRARIAN ECONOMY OF PARAGUAY, 1810-1840."# 
by Mario Pastore## 
Introduction 
I argue here that economic activity fell considerably in the first three 
decades of Paraguay's early national period, below levels it had attained in 
the late colonial period and would attain again only after mid nineteenth 
century. I attribute this economic depression to regional political 
fragmentation and the institutional regression it triggered. In the 1810s, the 
United Provinces of the River Plate sought to keep the former provinces of the 
Viceroyalty of the River Plate under a single federal government, but failed 
to prevent Paraguay's early secession. They then imposed trade blockades and 
military threats whose economic and political effects on Paraguay were 
profound: revenues from taxation of foreign trade fell, scale economies in the 
provision of defense and justice vanished, a standing Army emerged, public 
finance crises worsened, and mercantilist regulations were heightened. The 
fiscal burden and transactions costs in general increased. Proponents of 
federation, more representative governments, and freer trade progressively 
declined, while supporters of secession, political absolutism, and government 
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regulation became ever more prominent. Producers and exporters of forest goods 
and relatively larger landowners constituted the majority of the first group, 
while the small peasantry is generally thought to have made up the bulk of the 
second group. In the 1820s, blockade relaxations exacerbated state economic 
intervention, which included a substantial redistribution towards the state of 
property rights in land. In the 1830s, renewed blockading had more than 
proportional negative effects on economic activity, which remained below late 
colonial levels at least until international waterways became freely navigable 
shortly after mid-century. Colonial absolutism and mercantilism may be said to 
have been restored with a vengeance. Long run economic performance worsened. 1 
Of interest, then, is the behavior of an originally fairly open, largely 
agricultural, relatively distant colonial economy which initially was a part 
of the broad economic region surrounding the mines of Alto Peru but which 
later became a relatively isolated political unit of the subregion defined by 
the Paraguay-Parana-Uruguay river system. One might expect economic issues 
arising in this context to be amenable to treatment with the tools of 
international trade, land and locational rent, and regional theories. 2 Late 
colonial economic activity involved substantial factor mobility and may be 
thought of in terms of the staple theory of economic growth. 3 The early 
national economy, by contrast, involved little factor mobility, and is 
therefore better conceptualized in terms of Ricardo's comparative advantage 
theorem. Morever, the events I seek to account for are both economic and 
political in nature and may be better understood, I submit, by resorting to 
recent advances in political economy. Particularly useful are 
neoinstitutionalist contributions to the theory of property rights and of the 
predatory state. 4 Trade expansion and contraction bring about changes in 
political coalitions which may be analyzed using Rogowski's extension of the 
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Stolper-Samuelson theorem along collective action lines proposed by Olson. 5 
In this view, trade expansion will benefit owners of abundant factors and 
producers of goods using those factors intensively, which in economies where 
land is abundant relative to labour and capital will lead to to landowners 
aggressively seeking to further trade liberalisation vis-a-vis defensive 
labourers and capitalists; trade contraction, on the other hand, may be 
expected to benefit owners of relatively scarce factors and of goods produced 
using scarce factors intensively; that is, trade contraction may be expected 
to benefit small peasants, labourers, and artisans, who will seek protection, 
at the expense of landowners, who will oppose it. 6 Changes in the 
distribution of property rights and the institutional structure that affect 
incentive systems and economic performance have been linked to public finance 
crises. Particularly useful in this connection is North and weingast's recent 
analysis of seventeenth century England, which argues that budgetary crises, 
in the absence of an Army and of crown lands, forced absolute monarchs to 
trade revenue for rule making power with Parliament. Constitutional rule 
facilitated the development of a market in government securities and, later, 
in private securities. The capital market that developed as a result helped 
the eventual launching of the Industrial Revolution.? These, then, are the 
theoretical foundations on which I will build my analysis of the Paraguayan 
case. 
In contrast, the revisionist school has advanced a diametrically opposed 
interpretive view of Paraguay during the 1810-1840 span and the early national 
period as a whole. Dominant in the literature since at least the late 
seventies, its major hypotheses are consistent with an alternative theoretical 
vantage point. One of the latest proponents of these hypotheses has summarized 
them as follows: 
/ 
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"after gaining its independence in 1813 this republic experienced an 
original process of development. The experience began with a radical 
agrarian reform which concentrated most land in the hands of the state. 
Rented out at low cost, this vast state domain permitted the 
establishment of an important class of small farmers. Yields per hectare 
grew. ,,8 
In this view "a social revolution permitted the mobilisation of an important 
part of the agricultural surplus with a view to rapid accumulation in the 
modern sector of the economy." The process was "crowned, from 1852 to 1865, by 
a spectacular industrialisation effort."g This agrarian reform and 
industrialisation effort were led by the state, and scholars have therefore 
characterised the period as an early instance of "state-socialism." These 
hypotheses are purportedly supported by a body of quantitative evidence not 
previously available and are said to be consistent with dependency theory. 
cannot here discuss the evolution of the revisionist school or the 
historiography of the 1810-1840 period. I will only cite the major revisionist 
works in English that concern this period and are supported by archival 
research, which are those of White, Williams, and Reber. 10 No critical 
assessment of Paraguay's revisionist school is yet available nor is there a 
recent historiographical discussion of the literature on the period at 
issue. 11 
The major proponent of the revisionist-dependency school for the period 
of concern here is still White. His archival research furnished a data base 
that has been adopted by most subsequent contributors to the literature, 
friend or foe, and forms the core of the overall data base currently available 
on the early national period as a whole. 12 On close examination, however, 
I 
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these data turn out to offer only weak support for the revisionist hypotheses 
concerning the period at issue. 13 Furthermore, they suffer from shortcomings 
that appear to have gone unnoticed. I will show here that even if these 
shortcomings are disregarded the quantitative data set available for 1810-1840 
does not support claims of a social revolution, state-led agrarian reform, and 
state-led socialism during the period in question. I will also show that to 
the extent the evidence is reliable it more strongly supports the alternative 
hypotheses of this paper, which are consistent with additional evidence in 
secondary sources, as well as with new evidence for the preceding and 
subsequent periods. 14 
I attempt to support these claims in the sequel. To that end I have 
organised this paper as follows: section one reviews the late colonial period, 
in order to provide a benchmark by reference to which later changes in 
political and economic structure and performance may be judged. Section two 
consists of three subsections: subsection 2a describes in greater detail the 
failed attempts at federation of the early 1810'Sj subsection 2b relates the 
successful efforts of secessionists to prevail against external and internal 
foes by increasing the size of the army and moving progressively closer to 
absolutist rulej subsection 2c first discusses the blockade-induced economic 
recession and public finance crisis, which worsened as the 1810's wore onj it 
then describes the military reform of 1819 and the so-called Great Conspiracy 
of 1820, whose successful repression marked the secessionist regime's 
definitive consolidation. Section three considers the mounting public finance 
crisis of the early 1820's, the increase in international trade consequent 
upon the temporary relaxation of the blockades in the mid 1820's, the 
subsequent land expropriations by the state, the rise of state ranches, and 
the greater resort by the state to coerced labour that characterised that 
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decade. Section four considers the renewal of the blockades in the 1830's, 
whose recessionary effects were magnified by the now state economic 
intervention. Section five draws conclusions. 
Section 1. Late Colonial Trade Expansion, ~nstitutiona1 Change, and Economic 
Growth. 
In this section I draw on recent research results to paint a picture of 
the late colonial economy which portrays the period as one of substantial 
economic expansion, due mostly to exogenous economic stimuli and institutional 
innovation. As a result, by the early nineteenth century economic conditions 
and domestic political alignments differed from those of a century earlier. 
Economic activity quickened in Europe as well as in the European 
periphery as the seventeenth century crisis lifted. Economic growth resumed 
earliest in Holland and England, partly as a result of institutional 
innovation. Particularly important in this connection was the exchange of 
revenue for rule-making power between sovereign and Parliament that 
characterised transitions from absolute to constitutional monarchies. 
Constitutional rule encouraged the development of capital markets, helping the 
Industrial Revolution eventually get under way in that and other ways.1S 
British contraband trade with the peripheral Spanish colonies of the southern 
cone of South America increased in the eighteenth century, and begun to erode 
the generalised economic depression that had characterised that region for 
much of the seventeenth century. The center of gravity of the colonial economy 
shifted from the inland mines of Potosi, to Buenos Aires, the port through 
which the resource intensive silver and other output of the region could most 
easily be traded for European manufactures, which were comparatively more 
capital and labour intensive. 16 To increased British competition for its 
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empire's economic rents, Spain responded with the Bourbonic Reforms, which 
were partly economic and partly administrative in nature. The Edict of Free 
Trade (1778) further encouraged economic activity, in Paraguay by lifting some 
of the inter-provincial trade hindrances imposed by the Hapsburgs early in the 
seventeenth century. Administratively, the reforms included the creation of 
the Viceroyalty of the River Plate, with Buenos Aires as its seat. Government 
by intendants improved tax collections and the delivery of government 
services, defense included: the Buenos Aires garrisons were reinforced by 
larger silver subsidies from the Potosi treasury and men from the outlying 
provinces, Paraguay among them. l7 There, a corps of semi-professional, 
salaried officers drawn from among the scions of old land-owning families took 
over the leadership of the militias. ls 
Exports of Paraguay's main staple, yerba mate, increased particularly 
rapidlYi those of hardwoods and tobacco increased as well, though not as 
rapidly. Asuncion yerba exports in 1776 were only 26,429 arrobas but averaged 
195,102 arrobas per year from 1792 to 1796 and 271,322 arrobas per year from 
1803 to 1807. The rising regional trade increased demand for transportation 
(riverain as well as overland), and the rapidly growing city of Buenos Aires 
required hardwoods for construction and furniture. Imports increased as well 
but they remained substantially below exports. The Province enjoyed a balance 
of trade surplus and an inflow of specie. l9 
Increased exports raised the derived demand for inputs of labour, land, 
and cattle, as well as defense. As the price of labour rose, the state better 
enforced a 17th Century policy to grant no new encomiendas and to force vacant 
ones to revert to the crown. For all practical purposes, private encomiendas 
thus came to their final demise, and they were legally abolished in 1803. 2Q 
However, coerced indigenous labour lingered on, since the crown assigned the 
/ 
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retrieved encomiendas to state enterprises like the tobacco monopoly and the 
naval stores factory, or to private enterprises it sought to encourage, like 
the shipyards set up by Basque immigrants. The colonial administration 
subsidized these private enterprises by assigning them Indians workers who 
were paid wages lower than those prevailing in the market. While state 
enterprises relied more heavily on coerced indigenous labour, African slaves 
predominated in the private sector. That some private encomiendas may have 
persisted after they were legally abolished is suggested by the fact that 
after Spanish rule ended, an early national government reiterated the 
encomiendas' evolution, in 1812. African slavery remained in force as well, 
both de jure and de facto. 21 
Rising wages -in the yerba industry in particular- also contributed to 
voluntary migratory movements. There was a comparatively large immigration 
from other provinces as well as intra-provincial migration, of landless 
peasants to the yerba area in particular. New towns were formed, the land 
frontier was pushed farther out. 22 As demand for yerba increased and wages 
rose, a greater number of free peasants tended to devote a greater part of 
their time to working for wages in the yerba trade. The old custom of growing 
two crops per year, consequently, was progressively abandoned. 23 
Staple production and transportation required land and cattle as well. 
Paraguay's royal forests were the main source of yerba mate and wood for the 
viceroyaltYi thus, yerba gathering, logging, shipbuilding, and cartbuilding 
increased at several points along the Paraguay river. Land inputs into yerba 
mate or hardwood production typically were not privately owned since they grew 
mostly on crown lands. Entrepreneurs who wished to exploit resources owned by 
the crown could simply buy a license to that end. Licensing conditions were 
costly to enforce, however, and yerba mate and hardwood forests were exploited 
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much as a commonly owned resource. Greater yerba harvesting and logging thus 
led to deforestation, consistent with expectations based on the economic 
theory of common property resource use. 24 Tobacco, on the other hand, was the 
main cash crop of mestizo, guarani-speaking small farmers, who grew it 
alongside subsistence crops on their privately owned farms. 25 
Yerba production and hard-wood logging also required large inputs of 
cattle. In turn, cattle raising required grazing lands, which were available 
in the south east and in the north. Private owners of herds could rent these 
grazing lands from the crown or come to privately own them through royal 
grants. Privately owned ranches were formed, in the south from lands and 
cattle abandoned by the Jesuits. Azara observed that "ranches in Paraguay were 
smaller than in Argentina, and the cows tamer and fatter." However, the 
absence of surface salt ("barreros n ) and the climate itself made cattle 
raising relatively more difficult in Paraguay than in more southern provinces 
of the viceroyalty. Thus, late colonial Paraguay was a net importer of cattle. 
One would expect land rents to appear as export demand for land-intensive 
staples and cattle expanded and population increased, and evidence to that 
effect can be found dating back to the 1780'S.26 
The eighteenth century expansion of the yerba and cattle frontiers 
caused conflicts with equestrian Indians which required that forts be built. 
To help defray the costs of providing defense the state sought to establish 
royal ranches on the vast royal lands; "estancias del Rey" emerged where 
troops could raise horses and cattle and grow crops, thus helping to equip and 
feed themselves. The colonial administration remunerated military commanders 
in land, granted according to rank. For this reason, as well as because of 
their access to indigenous labour, military commanders became relatively 
prominent among cattle ranchers. 27 
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Increased production and exports attracted foreign capital. Greater 
domestic and foreign trade raised the demand for financial services; these had 
previously been furnished by the Church, but in the wake of the Reforms the 
state itself strove to furnish several types of financial services, a good 
example of which were the so-called "libranzas." Rapidly rising exports led to 
a surplus in the balance of trade, which was reflected in a net inflow of 
specie, absorbed partly by the greater volume of trade and partly by a price 
level increase. That a considerable inflation may have been observed is 
consistent with the fact that landowning families appear to have held 
significant hoards of silver plate. Conversely, such hoarding -by decreasing 
the stock of money- may have kept inflation below levels it might otherwise 
have reached. 28 Clearly, economic conditions in Paraguay in the first decade 
of the nineteenth century had improved substantially relative to the late 
1770's, when a royal inspector reported that the Province "needed redemption." 
Depending upon whether one takes as a benchmark the first decade of the 
nineteenth century, as do I, or the late 1770s,' as does White, the early 
national period will appear in a very different light. In the first case, the 
contrast with the late colonial period is much greater than in the second. 
Estimates of late colonial provincial product are as yet unavailable, but one 
can say without much hesitation that late colonial economic activity far 
outstripped that of the early national period. 29 
During the late colonial period, the old land-owning families and the 
newly arrived immigrants entered into a mutually beneficial division of labour 
and intermarried. The landowners raised cattle in the countryside while the 
immigrants concentrated on urban commercial activities, though neither 
appears to have specialised completely. However, the immigrants' influence on 
the Asuncion cabildo tended to increase at the expense of the landowners who 
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had formerly dominated it, on account of which some conflicts occurred between 
them. The colonial economy continued to boom until the European wars disrupted 
trade. 3o 
The nature of provincial political intercourse changed as a result of 
the late colonial economic expansion, which became more rapid after the 
Bourbonic Reforms. Paraguay had previously been a highly militarised province, 
because it was located on the empire's Portuguese and Indian frontiersj it had 
also been a fairly unruly colony, because military power -in addition to being 
fairly high- was relatively evenly distributed among the settlers. The crown 
had -for budgetary reasons- delegated its defense responsibilities onto the 
settlers in exchange for "encomiendas de indios," which were comparatively 
numerous and relatively small. 31 In addition, due to the relatively greater 
distances that separated Paraguay from Spain, this province's settlers had 
been authorized to elect their own governors in emergencies subject only to 
royal confirmation, a right they frequently exercised the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. However, the province lost that right in the 1730's, 
after the ill-fated "Comuneros Revolt." From then on, only the colonial 
administration named and removed governors. Furthermore, the Bourbons' 
determined effort to eliminate the decaying encomienda system implied that the 
military system would have to be reformed as well. As the encomiendas 
progressively disappeared, the self-financed encomendero-Ied militias gave way 
to a semi-professional officer corps largely paid out of royal revenues. In 
1801, the old "urbano" system was strengthened by the "filiado" system, whose 
salaried officers carne from among the most prominent creole landowning and 
encomendero families. As already noted, the encomiendas were outlawed shortly 
thereafter, in 1803. The Reforms centralised political power in the colonial 
bureaucracy and reorganised the military structure so that it more closely 
12 
resembled that of a standing army. Absolutism increased and coercive power 
became more concentrated in the hands of the state. No revolt comparable to 
that of the "Comuneros" again arose until the early nineteenth century.32 
In addition, the expansion of foreign trade altered traditional 
political cleavages. Increased yerba harvesting and cattle ranching improved 
the fortunes of pursuers of those activities, but had deleterious effects on 
agriculture, that of tobacco in particular. Rising wages in the yerba industry 
bid some labourers away from tobacco growers, who were also negatively 
affected because the Real Renta monopolised tobacco exports. Expanding cattle 
herds could not but have negative externalities on peasant plantings in the 
era before barbed wire. 33 
Section 2. 

Collapse of Federation, Rise and Consolidation of Secession, 1811-1820. 

This section analyzes in terms of the proposed theoretical framework the 
process by which political coalitions and their relative strengths altered 
during the course of the 1810's. It first considers how a coalition that 
favored more representative government, freer trade, and federation seized 
political power from the Spanish colonial administration after Napoleon's 
invasion of Spain, but collapsed relatively quickly. The resulting trade 
blockades and threats of invasion then led to a growing militarisation and 
absolute rule which favored secession and economic statism. The deepening 
economic contraction and an army reorganisation designed to strengthen 
absolutist rule in turn led to the Great Conspiracy of 1820, its repression, 
and the definitive consolidation of absolute rule. 
a)Following Ferdinand VII's fall, Buenos Aires sent military expeditions 
to Paraguay and Alto Peru to subdue loyalist forces there and keep the old 
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viceroyalty of the River Plate united under its leadership. These expeditions 
may have been dispatched not because royalist foes necessarily posed a serious 
military threat to the Buenos Aires army but to maintain the flow of subsidies 
those regions provided the port, silver from Bolivia and men from Paraguay in 
particular. Thus, the expeditions may have been prompted by both political and 
economic imperatives, including among the latter that of maintaining the 
subsidy aspect of the late colonial public finance structure. 34 
The expeditionary forces fought twice against the Paraguayan officers of 
the new filiado corps and militias under their command, who had rallied to the 
royalist cause at the Spanish governor's urging. Early in the first battle, 
the invading armies appeared on the verge of victory, so much so that the 
Spanish governor of Paraguay abandoned the battlefield and the royalist 
community attempted to flee Asuncion by boat. The Paraguayan officers and 
militias, however, despite being owed several month's back pay, remained on 
the field and eventually repelled the invasion. Their behavior need not puzzle 
us, however. These creole officers reportedly had been predominantly recruited 
from among local land-owning families who had economically benefited from the 
Bourbonic Reforms both directly and indirectly. Furthermore, many of these 
officers and militia men had participated in the defense of Montevideo and 
Buenos Aires, suffering grievous losses. By some estimates, these may have ran 
as high as 70%.35 They were understandably concerned, therefore, about 
reports that the Buenos Aires forces' real aim was to recruit for the Bolivian 
campaign. 
After defeating the Buenos Aires expeditionaries, however, these same 
officers are said to have fraternised with the Argentine commander, Belgrano, 
and to have come to share his political and economic ideas. They subsequently 
planned to depose the Spanish governor by a coup, to keep him from "turning 
/ 
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the Province over to a foreign power," an allusion to the Portuguese crown 
exiled in Brazil. Originally scheduled to coincide with the first anniversary 
of the Buenos Aires coup of 25 May 1810, the coup was moved up to the 14-15 
May 1811 for tactical reasons. Political power initially fell for the most 
part onto the hands of the senior military officers, who proceeded to 
appropriate the outstanding cash in government vaults for back pay.36 The 
Triumvirate that followed included the deposed Spanish governor, a Peninsular 
officer, and the cabildo representative to the Spanish Junta Suprema Central 
Gubernativa, a well-respected "criollo" lawyer from whom more would be heard, 
Francia. However, the military officers soon balked at the presence of 
Spaniards in the government, and at their prompting the Congress of June 1811 
named a new, expanded Junta Superior Gubernativa that included two of the 
creole military leaders, one representative each from the mercantile community 
and the clergy, and Francia. 37 There is evidence of a close association 
between Francia and the Asuncion cabildo, but White claims that Francia was an 
"at large" representative. 38 Analysts distinguish three political tendencies 
at this time, "realistas," "portenistas, " and "nacionalistas." Among 
royalists, Vargas Pena includes a Carlotist party, of which he contends 
Francia was a member. The royalist party may not unreasonably be supposed to 
have included some who were loyal to Carlota, Ferdinand VII's sister and wife 
of Portugal's Joao, then in Brazil. After her brother's abdication, she had a 
claim on the Spanish throne. Vargas Pena's argument seems consistent with 
Francia's functions in the colonial administration and the notion that he had 
no role in planning or executing the coup of the 14-15 May.39 Also among the 
royalists were some of the military.4o 
Only the military officers and the mercantile community's representative 
remained in the Junta in 1812, the clergy's representative having been forced 
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to withdraw by Francia, who later withdrew himself. This Junta's paramount 
concerns appear to have been improving education, extending municipal 
government, reducing taxes on the indigenous population, innovating the 
transportation technology, and maintaining good relations with neighbouring 
provinces while at the same time securing provincial borders. 41 The Congress 
of 1811 and the Junta Superior Gubernativa initially looked favorably upon a 
possible federation with Buenos Aires, provided the port agreed to dissolve 
the still remaining impediments to trade -most importantly the tobacco 
monopoly and the regulations that hindered free navigation to and from 
regional markets down river and beyond- and to resolve the issue of Paraguay's 
contribution to the military draft. The pressure of military imperatives 
forced Buenos Aires to accept what were essentially Asunci6n's terms, and an 
agreement was signed. 42 
However, the agreement dissolved fairly shortly amidst mutual charges 
that neither party had kept its end of the bargain, i.e., of opportunistic 
behavior. Buenos Aires now resorted to foreign trade blockades and military 
threats to maintain the old Viceroyalty of the River Plate united under its 
political leadership.43 The federalist project's collapse is a classic 
example of a collective action failure due to the free rider problem. Should 
Buenos Aires defeat loyalists in Uruguay, Bolivia, and Chile, and keep the 
Portuguese in Brazil at bay, Paraguay would benefit. Therefore, Buenos Aires, 
wished Paraguay to contribute to the struggle. However, Buenos Aires would 
have had to fight anyway, and might win, even if Paraguay did not contribute. 
Thus, it was rational for Argentina to seek to coerce Paraguay to cooperate in 
the struggle; it was similarly rational for Paraguay to seek to free ride, 
especially if it anticipated that the concessions Argentina offered in 
exchange for help would be short lived, as they in fact turned out to be. That 
/ 
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after the defeat of the 1811 expeditions Buenos Aires did not actually attempt 
to coerce Paraguay by direct military means but instead chose the lower cost 
option of blockading suggests that it anticipated the marginal costs of 
subjecting Paraguay to be lower than the marginal gains of so doing. 44 
b)The blockades Buenos Aires imposed on riverain traffic, however, 
though never total, appear to have been effective enough to cause exports and 
imports to fall, the shipping and transportation industries to contract, and 
tax revenues from foreign trade to decline. Moreover, averting the threat of 
forceful "federation" required the Paraguayan government to increase its 
military strength just as the blockades worsened the public finance picture. 
The government attempted to offset the budgetary pressure by progressively 
more drastic measures that went from raising the rate of income taxation to 
taxing wealth itself. The recessionary effects of these measures appeared in 
short order. Furthermore, as the Army grew, the balance of power shifted away 
from supporters of federation and freer trade and towards Francia, who had 
supported those aims initially but would turn against them later. Political 
power became progressively more concentrated in his hands, and he eventually 
became "perpetual II Dictator. 
This view is supported by the foreign trade and budgetary record of this 
decade, as well as by its political history. The foreign trade record clearly 
points towards a pronounced export decline. Paraguay's yearly export earnings 
averaged almost 400,000 pesos fuertes ($f) between 1792 and 1796. During the 
same period, average yerba mate exports accounted for roughly three fourths of 
export earnings, and approached 200,000 arrobas. By 1807 yerba mate exports 
reached nearly 300,000 arrobas. Although no data on export values is available 
these figures suggest that, barring a drastic decline in yerba mate prices, 
export earnings in the middle of the first decade of the nineteenth century 
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could possibly have increased substantially beyond their 1792 96 average. 
However, Table 1 and Figure 1 show that by 1816 export earnings had returned 
to their 1792 96 average, and continued to fall later in the decade. 4s 
Table 1 goes about here 
Figure 1 goes about here 
The budgetary record suggests that military considerations drove 
government spending and forced fiscal measures of a decidedly contractionary 
nature to be imposed. This contention emerges from an analysis of government 
budgets and military expenditures compiled by White for some of the years of 
this period. Government revenues and expenditures are respectively summarised 
in Tables 2 and 3, and are graphically depicted in Figures 2 and 3. 46 Tables 
4 and 5, and Figure 4, do the same for military expenditures. These figures 
paint a fairly clear picture of the unfolding process, despite the lack of 
several years' data. 47 
Table 2 goes about here 
Figure 2 goes about here 
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Table 3 goes about here 
Figure 3 goes about here 
Following his designation as Dictator, Francia further built up that 
portion of the Army and the Navy under his effective control. 48 Table 3 shows 
that between 1816 and 1820, military expenditures rose by about one third 
(31.6~) and troop strength more than doubled. White asserts that after 1815 
"the government constructed approximately 100 river craft, including sloops, 
flatboats, and enormous canoes ... ,,49 White's government budget figures reveal 
that in 1816 and 1818, allocations to the military, public works, and salaries 
of the state bureaucracy all increased. Only Church allocations, a small 
component of total expenditures, decreased. Tax revenues simultaneously fell 
as a proportion of total government revenues from 84~ to 52.5~ in the period 
in question, consistent with the notion that foreign trade blockades and 
higher taxation had caused an economic contraction. 50 The government ran 
substantial budget surpluses nevertheless, but only because lower tax revenues 
were more than offset by confiscations, whose value almost equaled that of the 
1818 budget surplus. 51 The budget surplus of 1818 reflected increased fines 
and confiscations applied to the private sector and the Church as well as the 
more stringent enforcement of the "droit d'aubaine," by which the assets of 
deceased foreigners without known heirs in the country became state property. 
After 1818, such government exactions appear to increase whenever there is a 
19 
budget deficit. 
Expenditures on the military and public works continued to increase in 
1820, and although there were some reductions in outlays for government 
salaries and church emoluments, total spending by the government continued to 
rise as well. However, export and excise tax revenues fell again in 1820. 
Revenues from export taxes contracted particularly precipitously.52 This fall 
was offset by increased sales of state products to the troops and the public, 
which rose throughout these years, but in particularly noticeable fashion in 
1820. In that year, most state sales to the public were accounted for by sales 
of agricultural products and cattle. 53 Confiscations, fines, state 
inheritances and rents of state property together did not amount to 5% of the 
budget. 54 The first overt budget deficit consequently appeared, equal to 
approximately 1/4 of total government expenditures. 
Table 4 goes about here 
Figure 4 goes about here 
Table 5 goes about here 
The political history of the decade is also consistent with that view. 
Presumably because they found themselves ill equipped to conduct negotiations 
with the portefios, the military officers in the government invited Francia ­
who had resigned- to rejoin the government. Francia agreed in November 1812, 
on condition that an additional battalion be equipped and put directly under 
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his command. Once he controlled a military force capable of offsetting that of 
the filiado officers, he progressively consolidated his political position. 
successively he edged out the representatives of the Church, of the mercantile 
elite and, finally, when the Congress of 1814 named him Dictator for a five 
year period, the military itself. A much smaller Congress designated him 
Dictator for life and "ser sin exemplar" in 1816. Both Congresses are said to 
have been dominated by lesser country folk, who presumably made up the bulk of 
Francia's supporters. No other congress was convened for the remainder of the 
decade, or of his rule, for that matter. 55 
As the Army's size increased and its composition changed, its general 
political attitudes altered. In early 1814 a significant portion of the Army 
outside Asunci6n still supported Federalism, as evidenced by the fact that the 
military commander of Paraguay's southernmost garrison, disobeying the 
Consuls' warnings not to intervene in regional squabbles, joined Artigas, the 
leader of federalist forces in the Banda Oriental. However, most federalists 
among the Army's filiado officers -despite the worsening economic situation­
abided by the Consuls' commands. Furthermore, they did not rebel against 
Francia when he became temporary or "perpetual" Dictator and appear to have 
reacted only after Francia decided, in 1819, to dissolve the filiado corps, 
merging the officers and the soldiers loyal to him into the urbano structure 
he commanded, and purging the rest. Apparently, only when their prerogatives 
and salaries were threatened did the federalist filiado officers decide to 
accept the long standing invitation of Uruguayan Federalists to join forces 
and overthrow Francia's government, but by then it was too late. The resulting 
military conspiracy was discovered and severely repressed, and the Army then 
fell under Francia's complete control. 56 
The reticence of Paraguayan federalist officers to join Artigas may 
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partly be accounted for by the fact that these military leaders were 
themselves cattle ranchers or came from cattle ranching families. Artigas' 
army wrought havoc on cattle herds and estancias. Therefore, the prospect 
allying themselves with Artigas, could not be reassuring to Paraguayan 
military officers. 57 Furthermore, Buenos Aires had threatened to invade 
Paraguay if it joined with federalist forces in the Banda Oriental and the 
Littoral. The fact that Paraguayan army federalists on the whole rejected 
overtures from their counterparts in Uruguay and Argentina's Littoral to join 
their struggle against Buenos Aires indicates that they regarded the latter's 
threat to invade Paraguay in such an eventuality as sufficiently credible to 
warrant adhering to a neutral position. The small peasantry, similarly, could 
also lose much more from participation in interprovincial struggles than from 
blockades and economic recession and must have been pleased by Francia's 
commitment not to meddle in provincial wars, to which he steadfastly adhered 
during this decade. The fact that he did not adhere to that commitment in the 
next two decades raises the question of opportunism. 
In conclusion, then, participating in military struggles outside the 
province necessarily implied paying the taxes in men and goods. Refusing to 
participate on Buenos Aires' side risked a foreign trade blockadej an alliance 
with the federalists risked an invasion from Buenos Aires and might involve a 
social upheaval as well. The government apparently chose the lesser evil, that 
is, it withstood a foreign trade blockade, even if that meant the temporary 
loss of markets downstream and economic recession, as well as the eventual 
threat of invasion of the federalists themselves. That there initially was 
majority support for this course of action among landowners, peasants, and the 
Army is clear. It is also clear that as costs rose support shrunk, especially 
among larger landowners and cattle ranchers and the sector of the army 
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associated with them. 
The federalist solution having failed, militarisation progressively 
increased and, as it did, so did the degree of monopoly the government 
exercised over political power. The ruler's military strength eventually grew 
to the point that he could absorb that portion of the Army still under the 
control of interior caudillos. Their belated attempt to form a coalition with 
the Uruguayan and Argentine Federalists was discovered and thoroughly 
repressed. The government confiscated their assets, thus attaining a degree of 
economic autonomy from taxation as well as a direct economic role that it did 
not posses before. The government's autonomy from those who had originally 
brought it to power grew as well. Up to now, however, economic recession and 
political repression had narrowed income differences between sectors of the 
population, but the country's property rights distribution had not drastically 
changed. It would during the next decade. 
Section 3. 	 Fiscal Crisis, International Trade, Land Confiscations, and 
Labour Coercion in the 1820's. 
I will argue in this section that, early in the decade of the 1820s, the 
economic depression and fiscal crisis deepened. Fortuitously, however, an 
increase in international trade that turned out to be temporary gave the 
government a chance to increase its revenues by expropriating lands, 
establishing state ranches worked with Army and other coerced labour, Indian 
as well as black, and selling the goods expropriated or produced in state 
enterprises in the domestic as well as the foreign market. 58 Throughout this 
decade the government increasingly resorted to measures of the type the late 
colonial administration had implemented and, in some cases, abandoned later 
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on, measures that those areas of the world caught in the transformations of 
the modern period had been discarding since the mid seventeenth century. Thus, 
Paraguay's early national government appears to have failed to innovate vis a 
vis the colonial institutional structure and progressive institutional 
tendencies elsewhere, as well as to have actually exacerbated some colonial 
institutional features, so that a veritable institutional regression may be 
said to have taken place. This, I contend, is properly referred to as 
neocolonialism. 
Let us first take up the question of public finances. Discussion of this 
issue is possible for the early and late twenties but not for the intervening 
four year period stretching from 1823 to 1828, for which data are not 
available; for the purposes of this section, however, a discussion of the 
early twenties will suffice. The data on the late twenties will be discussed 
in the next section in connection with the decade of the 1830's. 
On the expenditure side, expenses of the military and public works, 
government salaries, and Church emoluments dropped in absolute terms between 
1820 and 1822. on the income side, however, sales of state products to troops 
declined by 50% to almost one fourth of their 1820 value, and rents from state 
property were negligible. The fall in tax revenues was so drastic that only 
sizeable confiscations, 35-40% larger in nominal terms than those of 1818, 
allowed the government budget for 1822 to show a surplus, albeit a small 
one. 59 Although spending decreased still further in 1823, and tax revenues 
increased, there was another overt budget deficit amounting to 30% of total 
expenditures, possibly because there were no confiscations that year. 60 
Clearly, the government faced a bleak revenue picture in the early 1820s' . 
Consider now the issue of increased trade opportunities with 
neighbouring states and then the related one of land confiscations. Trade 
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options improved because both Brazil and Argentina sought better commercial 
relations with Paraguay, prompted by their brewing dispute over the Banda 
Oriental which eventually would lead them to the Cisplatine War of the late 
1820's.61 To Brazil's overtures, Francia responded that "on our part, there 
is no objection to trading with the Portuguese, in the same way that other 
peoples of America who have constituted themselves into independent states 
have done. 1162 To Buenos Aires' overtures, however, Francia chose not to 
respond at all, although transportation costs by water were lower than 
overland. 63 
Trade between Paraguay and Brazil would take place overland between two 
former Jesuit missions, ytapua, on the Parana River's right bank, and Sao 
Borja, on the Uruguay's left bank. Brazilian merchants carried Paraguayan 
products across Misiones to Sao Borja and from there to "Porto Alegre, which 
served as the distribution point for Montevideo, Buenos Aires, and Rio de 
Janeiro," that is, ports which normally could have been reached more easily by 
river from Asuncion, as well as down the Uruguay river. 54 Francia would later 
remark that lI(i)t now seems obvious that Buenos Aires .. is scheming to .. impede 
and cut the Brazilian commerce with Paraguay, which has hurt them as much as 
they envy it. 1I65 Apparently, Francia chose the higher cost, overland trade 
option with Brazil and rejected repeated Argentine offers to trade at lower 
cost via the Parana River in order to hurt Argentina by not letting it share 
in the gains from that trade. 56 It apparently concerned him little that his 
decision benefited Brazilian merchants at the expense of Paraguayan producers 
and merchants, and that the damage to Argentina would be slight, if any.67 
Francia's decision to give preferential treatment to Brazil was all the more 
unfortunate because official Brazilian interest in trading with Paraguay 
cooled once the Cisplatine War ended. Similarly, Argentine attitudes also 
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changed for the worse: in December of 1829 the last of the relatively free 
trade oriented Argentine governments was deposed by Rosas who, "backed by his 
estanciero allies and his rural hordes," retook power and resumed attempts to 
force Paraguay to join the United Provinces by commercial pressure. 68 
While the trade with Brazil lasted, however, Francia made determined 
efforts to encourage it. Most important among these was securing the trade 
routes over which the trade was carried. To that effect, as early as 1822 he 
ordered his military to occupy Candelaria, across the Parana in territory 
contested by Corrientes, which unleashed the so-called "undeclared war between 
Paraguay and Corrientes.,,69 In so doing, Francia broke with the policy of 
neutrality in regional military squabbles he had promised to follow in the 
early 1810's, by which he had improved his political fortune at the expense of 
federative efforts; his decision clearly shows that he was capable of breaking 
a political promise for commercial gain if he no longer required the political 
support that promise had earned him. Now that he had an army completely loyal 
to thim, that he had repressed the conspiracy of 1820, and that he had 
confiscated ranches from his political enemies he could clearly afford to 
disappoint some of his former peasant supporters if in the process he might 
obtain sorely needed revenues. This suggests opportunism. 
While Francia was willing to make a determined effort to keep trade 
routes with Brazil open in the southeast, he was not interested in something 
similar in the North, despite the fact that it offered an additional, lower 
cost substitute for decreased trade with Argentina. He thus closed the 
northern frontier with Brazil and rejected Grandsire's request to be allowed 
into Paraguay to search for the connection between the Paraguay and the Amazon 
rivers. 7o International trade was thus restricted to ytapua and pilar del 
Neembucu on the Paraguay river; no international trade was allowed to take 
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place through Asunci6n or Concepci6n. Though trade through ytapua was by far 
more important than through Pilar, it was rather small by comparison to the 
late colonial trade through Asunci6n. The colonial policy of "puertos 
precisos," therefore, was reinstituted. 
Trade through these ports, furthermore, could only take place on a 
barter basis. In forbidding that money should leave the country except for the 
purchase of arms, Francia had observed in the middle of the previous decade 
that lithe extraction of precious metal is not necessary to maintain foreign 
trade, assuming that a country's export always exceed its imports. II In the 
middle of the following decade, he reiterated that prohibition, and also 
ordered that import duties be paid in kind. 71 The measure prohibiting 
precious metals from leaving the country may have been prompted by a scarcity 
of money, possibly due to a balance of trade deficit or to hoarding. That 
there may have been a balance of trade deficit is suggested by the fact that 
individuals attempted to smuggle money out of the country. That there may have 
been hoarding as well is consistent with the fact that the number of 
silversmithing establishments in the country apparently grew. Francia may have 
sought to curtail hoarding in restricting the growth of these establishments 
in 1829. 72 
Until trade with Brazil improved in the early 1820s, then, Paraguay's 
economy had been in a pronounced downturn and state revenues had been rapidly 
declining. Even though it turned out to be temporary, this improvement was a 
sorely needed stimulus for the economy and government budgets, both of which 
may be said to have been gasping for air. Therefore, it would be more 
appropriate to characterise this decade's trade with Brazil as the device that 
kept the economy and government budget afloat rather than as an "escape 
valve," as proposed by White. For White's alternative characterisation to be 
/ 

27 
correct Paraguay's economy had to be overheating, that is, growing rapidly 
under the sole impulse of a strong domestic demand, and the trade must have 
somehow served to decrease demand. Clearly, domestic demand was not strong in 
the early twenties; furthermore, the trade with Brazil, if anything, raised 
demand. 73 
Let us now consider the state's land expropriations and the subsequent 
establishment of state ranches. The early national state, from its inception, 
owned substantial amounts of lands. It had inherited them from the colonial 
administration upon independence and had changed only their name; they ceased 
to be royal lands and instead became public lands. Subsequently I land 
confiscations substantially increased the acreage under state control. Though 
a few confiscations took place in the 1810 / s, the bulk of the confiscations in 
the period under study occurred in the 1820 / s. Four waves of expropriations 
were observed in that decade. The first came about immediately after the 
repression of the "Great Conspiracy" of the 1820's and affected lands owned by 
those summarily convicted of having participated in the conspiracy; the second 
wave aimed at the lands of religious organisations I expropriated in 1823 and 
1824; the third l at the lands of private proprietors or squatters without 
clear title which the state confiscated after 1825; and the fourth, in 1828, 
may have affected recipients of colonial land grants who had not fulfilled the 
conditions to which they had obliged themselves upon receipt of the grant, 
more specifically, the requirement of settling the lands they had been 
granted. It is clear that the great bulk of the expropriations came after the 
"Great Conspiracy" and before Rosas/s rise to power in Argentina. The second, 
third and fourth waves of confiscations, to which a substantial part of the 
total acreage confiscated may be attributed, came after Francia accepted 
Brazilian overtures to improve commercial relations. Some of the confiscated 
l 
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lands were transformed into state ranches, others were rented. I will now 
examine the transformation of expropriated lands into state ranches in greater 
detail. I will also make reference to the question of rents of state lands, 
but will reserve a fuller discussion of this issue for the next section. 
In the 1810's the state expropriated relatively minor amounts of land, 
from state debtors and from those who had not fulfilled the requirements of 
their land grants. Those lands were consolidated with those of a former royal 
ranch the government sought to restock in order to facilitate the provisioning 
of troops that would man military defense lines against Indian attacks in the 
south. 74 Land belonging to foreigners who had died without heirs also accrued 
to the state as a result of the application of the "droit d'aubaine." 
The rate of confiscations increased rapidly following the discovery of 
the "Great Conspiracy" and its repression in 1820. Francia approved "autos" to 
permit the state to confiscate all the property of the convicted. An idea of 
the amount of land, livestock, and slaves involved can be gleaned from the 
case of Manuel Cavafias, who died in prison over 12 years after his conviction. 
The state confiscated two estancias, twenty three slaves, 3727 head of cattle, 
502 studs, 1,178 mares and 21 mules he owned in one locality alone 
(Tebicuary). Cavafias is said to have owned more properties than this evidence 
would suggest, and these may have been confiscated as well. "The Yegros and 
Montiel families (four of the former and eight of the latter were shot in 
1821) forfeited a far larger patrimony to the state." From the fact that the 
executed army officers were themselves landowners or belonged to the landowner 
class it has been inferred that "the property gained by the state was 
enormous," though no mention is made of the total acreage expropriated. 75 
Next came the Church lands. The Colegio Seminario de San Carlos was 
ordered closed on 23 March 1823, and all the furniture and effects in its 
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urban locale were transferred to the "Administraci6n de propiedades," a state 
agency charged with administering state property that also took over the 
Colegio's farm at Nu Guazu and its other lands. These included holdings in 
fourteen different locations in the country.76 In addition, Francia decreed 
the so-called "Reforma de Regulares" on 20 September 1824, ordering that all 
monasteries be dissolved and their clergy secularised. The sworn inventories 
that each monastery was required to present to the government have yet to be 
thoroughly examined. Thus, the overall quantum and value of church assets 
expropriated by the state is unclear. It appears, however, that "at least one 
conventual house had managed to retain considerable wealth to the day of its 
dissolution. This monastery admitted its several buildings in Asuncion, 
sizeable amounts of land in various places, herds of livestock, and 43 slaves. 
In addition, it received rents from more than 90 families renting monastery 
land." The five orders' main buildings, four in Asunci6n and one in Villa 
Rica, were turned into barracks, and their wealth was transferred to the 
government treasury. 77 
Furthermore, Francia decreed in September of 1825 that within three 
months individuals should present the titles to the lands they occupied or 
they would be declared property of the state. " .. in February of 1826, more 
than half of the lands ... of the Eastern Region and the whole of the Chaco 
territory" were declared state property.78 Finally, in 1828 Francia notified 
recipients of unsettled royal land grants that they had two months to fulfill 
the conditions of the grant, i.e., to effectively occupy their lands, or the 
state would expropriate them and send poor families to the Southern Coast to 
settle them. 79 The expropriated ranches were rechristened as "ranches of the 
fatherland." The process resembled the colonial "denuncia y composici6n," 
except that ranches whose titles were not in order became state property. 
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There may have been state ranches before the confiscations but they are 
likely to have been few. There is evidence suggesting that the early national 
state owned two ranches. For example, we know that as early as lS13 the 
consular government sought to establish a settlement (Tevego) in the northern 
frontier (the so-called "Northern Coast") and to restock an existing state 
ranch there and in the southern frontier (the so-called "Southern Coast") . 
This measure sought to further support the defense effort against Indian 
attacks, which had made it necessary to establish additional forts in both the 
Northern and the Southern Coasts in the lS10's. Thus, in lS14, the consular 
government, then headed by Francia, restocked the existing state ranch at 
Concepcion, for which it bought 1700 head of cattle and 150 mares. Francia 
also "reestablished a cattle ranch" in the south, and widened it in lS16 with 
lands of two types, those expropriated from state debtors and those unsettled 
by its grantees. Squatters were evicted to consolidate the lands with those of 
the state ranch. Secondary sources show no additional hard evidence that more 
ranches may have been formed until after the Great Rebellion of lS20. 80 
The assertion that state ranches may have been few before the lS20's 
runs counter to earlier estimates. Williams puts the number of royal ranches 
inherited by the early national state at forty.81 This figure is based on a 
list which its proponent claims is from lSlS. Francia did comission an 
inventory of state ranches that year. 82 Authors like Galeano Romero and 
White, however, have suggested that Williams' list is not from lS18, White 
claiming that "it is more recent than 1827. ,,83 State ranches may have been 
numerous in the lS10s' had the ranches of the expelled Jesuits fallen under 
direct state administration after the order's expulsion. However, many former 
Jesuit ranches appear to have been turned over to the Colegio Seminario de San 
Carlos, according to Riquelme Garcia and to Rivarola Paoli, as well as to 
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private individuals, according to Rengger and Longchamps.a4 Thus, the number 
of state ranches administered by the state itself is likely to have been low 
until after the expropriation following the "Great Conspiracy" and the 
dissolution of the religious orders, that is, until the 1820s. 
The state used the produce of the ranches it confiscated mainly to feed 
and equip the troops and other state employees. The remainder -agricultural 
produce, livestock, and merchandise- was sold in the domestic market as well 
as to Brazilian traders. State budget figures put together by White suggest 
that sales of state products to the public (SSPP) were negligible in 1816 and 
1818, but they rose in 1820, the year of the Great Rebellion, fell again in 
1822 and 1823, and increased once more after Church and other lands were 
expropriated. In 1823, the year before the Reforma de Regulares, SSPP were one 
fourth of what they were in 1828, the year when the last wave of 
expropriations was carried out. as 
The state also rented the lands it expropriated. Revenues collected on 
this account are given in Table 6, according to which rents of state lands 
drastically declined between 1816 and 1818, both absolutely and as a share of 
total revenues, were negligible from 1822 until the mid twenties, but rose 
substantially in 1828 and 1829, the next two years for which there is data. 
The fact that rents of state property decreased in the late 1810s and became 
negligible in the first half of the 1820s, together with the fact that sales 
of state products to the public were negligible during the 1810s, further 
support the contention that state ranches may have been fairly few prior to 
the confiscations of the 1820s. That revenues from state land rentals should 
have suddenly increased in the late twenties must evidently be attributed to 
the confiscations. Part of the increase may be due to the fact that tenants 
who rented land owned privately or by the Church before the confiscations 
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began paying rent to the state immediately thereafter. 
State rental revenues included those the state received for renting the 
common lands of towns. Rentals of town's common lands and the collection of 
the resulting revenues had customarily been the prerogative of town councils 
but the central government apparently assumed those functions sometime in the 
mid twenties. 86 White reports that for the 10 year period 1827-36, the 
government collected a yearly average of 350 pesos on this account, but does 
not specify the number of "homesteads" in the ejidos in question. 
Table 6 Goes About Here 
Figure 6 goes about here 
Analogously, the government redirected the produce of the tithe as well. 
The national state took over the Patronato Real following the collapse of 
Spanish rule, and continued to raise the tithe for the Church in exchange for 
the so-called "two ninths." Following the Reforma de Regulares, however, 
Francia apparently devoted at least some tithe revenues to his army. Williams 
(1973b) reports that "(a)s early as 1823, the diezmos from the Concepcion area 
were allocated for the support of the northern Chaco presidios which protected 
northern Paraguay against Indians. ,,87 
Political factors clearly influenced Francia's land confiscations 
immediately after the Great Conspiracy as well as other confiscations later in 
the decade. However, the contention that the confiscations following the Great 
Conspiracy were mainly politically motivated relies on the assumption that 
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there was such a conspiracy. However, evidence supporting the contention that 
the alleged conspiracy did in fact take place is, at best, rather thin. The 
"conspiracy" was presumably discovered as a result of a confession passed on 
by a priest to the authorities. Summary trials were held subsequently, but 
evidence in favor or against the charges was subsequently destroyed by the 
government. Velazquez asks: "Was there a conspiracy in 1820?" and answers that 
"(t)here mayor may not have been one ...There is a wide bibliography on the 
subject, .. but we do not find in it objective testimonies allowing us to 
arrive at the definitive certainty (that there was such a conspiracy) ."a8 
Much more compelling is the evidence presented above, which suggests an 
alternative contention, i.e., that public finance considerations played a 
major role in unleashing all the waves of land confiscations of the decade of 
the twenties. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that the confiscations may 
have been prompted more by economic than by political rationales. 
The alterations in the distribution of landed property rights described 
above has been labeled an "original," state-led "agrarian reform. ,,89 The 
claim to originality seems to be misplaced, however. It has long been claimed 
that Francia's land rentals were simply the early national version of the 
colonial emphyteusis, which was itself adapted from the older European 
emphyteusis. 9o This is consistent with the fact that the colonial legal 
system in general remained in force -unaltered, for the most part- in 
Paraguay's early national period. 91 Furthermore, Francia's emphytheusis ­
curiously enough- follows attempts by the governments of Rodriguez and 
Rivadavia in the eighteen twenties to institute the emphyteusis system in 
Argentina. 92 Coincidentally, rents of state property in Paraguay, which were 
mostly made up of state land rentals, did not begin to rise as a proportion of 
government revenues until the late twenties according to Table 6. The colonial 
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emphytheusis did suffer some modifications under Francia during the early 
national period in the sense that Francia's emphyteusis, like Rivadavia's, 
differed from the European in that land did not eventually become the tenant's 
property. However, this could hardly be called original. 93 In the case of the 
emphytheusis, therefore, Francia added his own twist to an old institution, 
making it more stringent, i.e., asserting the interests of the state over 
those of individuals. The assertion regarding the colonial character of 
Francia's land rentals, therefore, is largely correct, and to the extent it is 
Francia's land expropriations and rentals cannot be said to have been 
"original." 
Claims of "agarian reform" are also hard to take seriously since 
property rights changes clearly differed from what is normally understood by 
that expression, i.e., land distribution in private property at or below 
market prices to landless peasants. Furthermore, in order to effect it the 
government in fact expropriated lands from peasants, evicted squatters from 
lands it expropriated from non-peasants and consolidated into state ranches, 
charged rents to the very peasants whose lands it expropriated for the 
privilege of remaining on their old lands, and charged peasants rents for 
using the common lands of their own towns as well as for letting them use the 
lands of state ranches. 
Consider now the question of state ranch operation, that of the labour 
force used on them in particular. The consensus opinion is that state ranches 
were operated by the Army and there is evidence that state ranches did use 
Army recruits. 94 However, it is also clear that state ranches employed other 
forms of coerced labour. I have already referred to evidence suggesting that, 
in expropriating the assets of its political opponents and the religious 
orders, the state became the owner of a good number of black slaves, whose 
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status remained unaltered under their new master. Moreover, after the mid 
1820s the state apparently made slaves of free blacks. 95 Furthermore, there 
is evidence that the state may also have compelled indigenous people to render 
services from which they had already been legally exempted earlier in the 
colonial or national period. According to white, Francia moved Indian 
communities north of the Parana river, 
"close enough to the river to be protected by Paraguayan military 
patrols -under the direct supervision of the central government. 
Limiting the power of the mayordomos, he reorganised the local economies 
by employing the Mission inhabitants .. in the production of tobacco, 
yerba, and hides, much of which was traded with the Brazilians .. as well 
as in the manufacture of cotton cloth, shoe soles, and hats .. ,,96 
The resettled indigenous communities to which White refers are the five Jesuit 
Mission towns of the Candelarias district that Francia forcefully moved north 
of the Parana river in 1817. 97 In addition to relocating the five former 
mission towns in the late 1810s, the Army transferred indigenous people from 
the Candelarias district to the northern shore of the Parana river in several 
other instances in the early twenties. Smaller groups of indigenous people 
were resettled north of the Parana river by both the military expedition that 
forced Bompland's large party from Candelaria to the north shore of the Parana 
river in 1821, and the large, long-lasting expedition of 1823, which crossed 
the Parana River and went as far south as the Uruguay river, apprehending all 
suspicious individuals. 98 
White's statement is consistent with Rengger and Longchamps' report 
that, in 1823, Francia 
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n •• ordered a detailed estimate of the possessions of each settlement to 
be made out. At the same time he contracted the power of the managers 
and forbad them to make purchases or sales, without his express 
permission. Since then he has employed the Indians for the immediate 
account of government, either in manufacturing cotton cloths for the 
clothing of the troops, or as the labourers and hewers of wood for 
public works. ,,99 
Under the name of mayordomos, Francia appears to have reinstituted the 
colonial office of the corregidores de indios, which the Bourbonic intendants 
were supposed to have done away with. The corregidores de indios, it will be 
remembered, had what amounted to a trade monopoly in the towns assigned to 
them. They could force town dwellers to purchase clothing from them at 
inflated prices and to sell their products only through them. 100 The 
previously quoted passage suggests Francia allowed mayordomos less power than 
corregidores had had to engage in commercial activities. The power of the 
mayordomos as agents of the central government, on the other hand, may have 
actually increased. This is suggested by the appearance -beginning in 1828- of 
a new item on the receipts side of government budgets, "transfers from 
mayordomos of pueblos" to the central government. 101 
The nature of the work these indigenous people were supposed to furnish 
the government may be gleaned from archival evidence and the reports of 
contemporary observers. To cite just one example of archival evidence 
available in this connection, in 1821 Francia wrote to Norberto Ortellado, 
Subdelegado de Santiago: 
"the six Guaycuriices work perfectly in public works with the other 
Indians, and all are imprisoned with chains. They will thus get used to 
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living in subjection, busy, and working, which is much better and for 
them than that they should take to the trade of bandits and 
highwaymen. 102 
According to travel reports the government designated particular crops such as 
wheat and cotton for cultivation in certain areas in the south such as 
TebicuarYi it is possible that the reference is to these resettled former 
mission towns. 103 
All this indicates that Francia consolidated Indian towns north of the 
Parana River, where the sway of his military was stronger, subjected them to 
military rule, put them under the direct administration of agents of the 
central go¥ernment, the mayordomos, set them tasks, and taxed them. 
The question now arises, what lands were these indigenous communities 
assigned to support themselves and satisfy state requirements? They must have 
been assigned some lands for they could not otherwise have carried out 
production of agricultural staples. Clearly, the state could have settled the 
indigenous population on the lands it expropriated from the Colegio and the 
religious orders. The data itself, therefore, suggest the hypothesis that 
budgetary pressures together with increased commerce with Brazil contributed 
to the state's land expropriations and increased reliance on coerced labour. 
Rengger and Longchamps furnish evidence consistent with the hypothesis. 
Describing the political organisation of "that part of Paraguay.. known as 
Misiones" which "extends over a surface of six hundred square leagues" and 
"consists of eight tribes of Indians" they observe that "the Indians, attached 
to the soil and condemned to work on state lands, have peculiar officers, who 
under the name of administrators, manage the state lands besides exercising 
the function of commandant over the Indians." They furthermore state that 
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"several other villages inhabited by the Indians in the interior of the 
country, which formerly belonged to the Jesuits or other religious communities 
have also managers set over them. ,,104 In addition, numerous communications 
between Francia and Norberto Ortellado during the early twenties attest to the 
fact that the Army "aggregated" the indigenous people captured south of the 
Parana river to previously existing Indian communities north of the 
river. 10S Finally, Rengger and Longchamps state that 
" (t)here used to be, before, no such thing as a dexterous workman in 
Paraguay. But the Dictator, by the number of the public works which he 
caused to be undertaken, gave a spring to industry: and as the projects 
which he conceived were above the capacity of the artizans whom he 
employed, he had recourse to intimidation in order to awaken that 
natural ability with which every native of Paraguay is endowed. He 
caused a gibbet to be erected, and he threatened a poor shoemaker to 
hang him up, because he had not made some belts of the size he required. 
Thus it was that out of blacksmiths, shoemakers, and masons, he created 
a race of whitesmiths, saddlers, and architects. ,,106 
In conclusion, the observation that slavery was extended to previously 
free blacks, and the contention that colonial forms of coerced indigenous 
labour reappeared during the Francia regime can be seen to have obtained 
within the context of expanding -rather than contracting- trade. Future 
archival research may yield further support for the hypothesis. l07 
The real rationale for Francia's alteration in the distribution of 
landed property rights through expropriations, state ranches, and emphyteusis, 
contend, was that suggested by the data itself, that is, revenue raising. I 
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Clearly, these measures were a tax increase. loa They were intended to 
address budgetary crises and, therefore, they are best regarded as a public 
finance reform rather than as an agrarian reform. Fiscal expediency was also 
the rationale for the Argentine emphyteusis, not any thought of reorganizing 
the nation's public finances around a single land tax similar to the "impet 
unique" proposed by the French Physiocrats. The scheme appears to have had 
just as little success in Argentina, where "(t)ill 1827 revenues from this 
source barely exceeded 5,000 pesos! ,,109 
Thus, public finance crises in the presence of improved international 
trade would seem to have led in opposite directions in Paraguay as contrasted 
to seventeenth century England. Conditions there allowed rulers to separate 
military from tax collecting bureaucracies, which led to the rise of standing 
armies and reduced rent-dissipation at various points along the hierarchical 
structure that transmitted revenues from contributors to the ruler. Budgetary 
pressures led British rulers to exchange rule making power for revenues, 
partly because the sale of public lands -itself a revenue raising measure- had 
been completed by then and there was a comparatively small army.110 
I have shown that this unexpected behavior is clearly rooted in the fact 
that increased opportunities to trade resource intensive goods with Brazil 
raised the price of inputs that would be used intensively in their production 
and, therefore, land prices and land rent. However, this mechanism was at work 
in early modern England as well. Why did the Paraguayan government not divide 
up the lands among individuals, allow them to produce goods for export with 
wage labour, and tax the factor incomes thus generated both directly and 
indirectly, as in England? Why did the Paraguayan government at this point 
expropriate lands and set up state enterprises worked with Army and other 
coerced labour, African and indigenous? Clearly, the government must have had 
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a comparative advantage in organizing a military structure capable of backing 
the expropriation of lands and running ranches. It must have had a comparative 
disadvantage in forming a civilian bureaucracy made up of relatively better 
educated civil servants capable of carrying out tax collecting activities. 
Labour suitable for military purposes must have been in greater supply than 
labour suitable for a civilian bureaucracy. Given the country's colonial past, 
this is easy to understand. The Junta Superior Gubernativa was conscious of 
this shortcoming and put great emphasis on fashioning an effective educational 
policy. By contrast, Francia's very policies exacerbated the shortage by 
reducing both the existing stock of educated personnel as well as the rate of 
addition to it. 
Among measures that reduced the stock of educated personnel were the 
prohibition that Spaniards occupy government positions, the exiling of Spanish 
Americans from other former provinces who had cooperated in the movement for 
independence (Somellera, de la Cerda), and the exclusion of the relatively 
better educated creole elite from the government, through intimidation, 
imprisonment, exile (whether decreed or self imposed) or execution. 
Most important among policies that reduced the rate of addition to the 
stock of educated personnel were the closure of the Colegio Seminario de San 
Carlos and the dissolution of the religious orders. lll Cooney's analysis of 
educational policies between 1810 and 1850 concludes that "in his drive for 
power (Francia) brought havoc upon the educational system of the new 
republic. ,,112 Also of consequence in connection with reducing the flow of 
educated personnel was Francia's prohibition that spaniards marry among 
themselves, which hindered the formation of families and, one would therefore 
presume, the intergenerational transfer of knowledge. Francia's marriage 
prohibitions aimed at extending the fiscal implications of the colonial droit 
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d'aubaine. The Junta Superior Gubernativa asserted the droit d'aubaine's 
continued validity while simultaneously declaring jurisdiction over the assets 
of provincials who died in similar circumstances. 113 Francia, however, 
appears to have sought to increase the number of foreigners subject to the 
droit d'aubaine, for on March 1, 1814 he forbade "any marriage of a European 
male to an American woman known to be Spanish by the people, from the first to 
the last of the classes of the state, no matter how infima y baja," even in 
the case of alleged rape. He established severe penalties for priests who 
might perform such marriages as well as for grooms who should marry openly or 
clandestinely. He also forbid Europeans to act as witnesses in baptisms or 
confirmations of children of the same class, or in weddings. Europeans could, 
however, "wed Indian women of the Indian towns, known mulatto women, and black 
women," Viola remarks: "As it may be imagined, many Spaniards preferred to 
remain single rather than lower themselves socially by mixing with the lowest 
social classes." Potthast-Jutkeit suggests that this law applied at first only 
to Europeans recently arrived in Paraguay, but was later extended "to all 
Europeans, no matter how long they had lived in America, and even to people 
from other Latin American countries." 114 That the ban's significance was 
predominantly fiscal is evidenced by the fact that individuals could be 
exempted from the ban by purchasing a license for a large payment to the 
Treasury.115 This attitude contrasts with that of the Junta Superior 
Gubernativa, which asked the Church to simplify marriage requirements in order 
to increase the number of marriages as a means to the "true opulence and 
prosperity of Republics" and "to improve customs".116 Thus, a similar 
argument may be made for Francia's droit d'aubaine as for his emphytheusis, 
i.e., that it was clearly of colonial inspiration but that it went beyond its 
colonial antecedent for reasons of fiscal expediency. 
/ 
42 
Thus, the government's own policies forced it to proceed in the 
direction in which it progressively moved. Owing to the lack of educated, 
trustworthy personnel onto whom tasks could be delegated, much of the 
government's petty decision making and bureaucratic work ended up having to be 
carried out by Francia himself. This has been seen as evidence that he was a 
workaholic. However, he himself bitterly resented the imposition but 
attributed it not to his own policies, but to the fact that he found himself 
"in a country of nothing but idiots, where the Government has no one to 
turn its eyes to, it being necessary that I should do .. everything in 
order to remove Paraguay from the unhappiness .. in which it has been 
.. for three centuries. ,,117 
The statement goes on to reveal Francia's view of himself as the country's 
only possible savior, as well as the nature and volume of the tasks he had to 
perform. llS 
The national government's agricultural policy was clearly designed in 
response to public finance imperatives and the constraints of foreign trade 
and labour supply conditions. In this regard it resembled that of the late 
colonial administration, whose intervention in production and foreign trade 
was also closely associated with its intervention in and regulation of the 
labour and land markets. However, though the motivation and methods were 
similar, the national state resorted to land expropriations and labour 
coercion to a much greater degree than the late colonial administration. 119 
Furthermore, the spread of state property in land discouraged the development 
of a financial sector beyond the levels reached in the late colonial period. 
The development of private property in land facilitates the use of land as 
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collateral for bank loans and thus encourages the development of a financial 
sector. The development of state property in land at the expense of private 
property, skews the distribution of land assets towards the state. Private 
lenders are likely to be fewer, if only because they will only be able to 
grant loans that can be secured by this years' harvest as opposed to the 
land. 120 Thus, if the state holds most rights to the country's surface land 
and subsoil, it will be the only agent in a position to become a major lender. 
By contrast, the early sale of crown lands in England was one of the main 
forces leading to the rise of a British market in government securities in the 
seventeenth century, North and Weingast contend. Private securities were also 
traded in this market later on, and a full fledged capital market developed. 
Changes in the property rights distribution brought about political 
changes as well. In this connection, the confiscations of the early twenties, 
affecting Francia's political opponents and the Church, seem to have had more 
of an effect than those of the late twenties. Arguing that the Asuncion 
cabildo was not "of popular sanction, but only an arbitrary institution of the 
already extinguished Spanish regime, which neither has nor exercises 
legitimate public representation, having lived on in this city .. without need, 
as experience has demonstrated," Francia suppresed the cabildo of Asuncion on 
30 December 1824, and replaced its officers by appointed administrative 
functionaries. 121 Francia also closed the cabildo in Villarrica, the second 
largest town in the country. White has argued that while the Asuncion and 
Villarrica cabildos were suppressed, those of interior towns were not. 
However, besides those of Asuncion and Villa Rica, there had been at most 
three other cabildos in Paraguay in towns that during the colonial period were 
known as "pueblos de espafioles, " those of Curuguaty and Pilar the Neembucu, 
founded early and late in the eighteenth century, respectively, and that of 
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Concepcion, founded by the Junta Superior Gubernativa, in 1812. In discussing 
IIinterior towns, however, Rengger and Longchamps state that (t)hese villas, 
since the suppression of their cabildos, which were charged with the local 
administration of justice, enjoy no longer any exclusive privilege. Each 
section is under the authority of a commandant, who executes the orders of the 
Dictator, directs the operations of the police, decides on minor offenses, and 
exercises the functions of conciliator." It would appear, then, that contrary 
to White's assertion, all cabildos of former Spanish towns were suppresed. 
That cabildos of towns in the interior were also dissolved and that their 
functions were absorbed by the central government is consistent with the 
already noted fact that the central government took over the cabildo function 
of renting out ejido lands and collecting the resulting revenues. Indian towns 
also had cabildos of their own, but the fact that Francia appointed mayordomos 
to oversee them suggests that, if they were not suppressed, they were not very 
effective. Furthermore, Rengger and Longchamps state that "there formerly 
existed a tribunal of commerce, which was suppressed in 1824." Finally, in 
1828 Francia suppressed the Cabildo Eclesiastico. 122 
In addition, the extension of state landownership increases the sources 
of revenue available from which the government can draw without prior 
parliamentary consent. It also encourages governments pressed by budget 
deficits to obtain revenues through arbitrary exactions rather than with the 
consent of the contributors' representatives. 
The preceding evidence suggests that the state was comparatively 
autonomous. This evidence is not consistent with the notion that the state was 
the instrument of the small peasantry, as contended by White. The state was 
relatively more responsive to the small peasantry during the 1810s but not in 
the following two decades. 123 Furthermore, the state clearly was not the 
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instrument of the landlords, as contended by Abente, for it pursued policies 
inimical to their interests, repressed them politically, and eventually 
expropriated the assets of some of the most prominent among them.124 On the 
contrary, there is evidence suggesting that the state may have made it 
possible for military officers to become landlords. Thus, one of Francia's 
military subdelegates asked for permission to establish a private cattle ranch 
in 1821. Francia granted the request and suggested that the subdelegate also 
set up "a good farm, for that is not forbidden, assuming that there there are 
lands in excess and that you will do so at your own expense" .125 
Section 4. Foreign Trade and Public Finances in the 1830's. 
For a while in the 1830s' export values rose above the levels of the 
1820s'. However, they never reached half their 1816 level and declined again 
after 1837. Itapua exports of yerba, tobacco, livestock, and hides, show a 
similar pattern. Both yerba and tobacco exports rose but then declined, yerba 
peaking earlier than tobacco. Livestock exports disappeared after 1832, while 
exports of hides, which were minor in the late 1820s' and early 1830s' , 
increased substantially in the mid 1830s' but declined late in that 
decade. 126 The composition of exports reflected the state's increased 
economic role. white's figures for yerba and tobacco exports distinguish 
between private and state exports. In general private exports exceeded state 
exports, although government yerba exports exceeded private ones in 1837. 
The structure of the revenue side of public finances was -by the late 
twenties clearly different from what it had been in the late colonial and 
very early national periods, except for the fact that confiscations, fines, 
and forced contributions continued to be used as revenue-raising devices. 
Import and export tax revenues, which were comparatively large in the late 
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colonial period, were zero in 1828. Furthermore, revenues from domestic taxes 
accounted for only 30% of total government revenues. Most domestic tax 
revenues resulted from taxation in kind. The tithe, in particular, accounted 
for 86% of domestic tax revenues. On the other hand, over 60% of government 
revenues came from non-tax sources, rents of state lands and other property as 
well as sales of state products to the public and to troops. I will now 
examine these in greater detail, beginning with rents of state lands. 127 
a. Rents of State Lands. A list of ejido rentals for 1832 lists 160 
homestead, leased for a total of 395 pesos, or an average of 2.5 pesos each 
per year. A similar list for 1839 includes 174 homesteads leased for a total 
of 359 pesos, for an average of 2.1 pesos each. The numbers seem to suggest 
that the ejido rental rates were falling in the eighteen thirties but the 
number of observations is too small to conclude that they were, which would be 
consistent with what we know about the behavior of international trade. 128 
Reference has already been made to the transfers from mayordomos of 
pueblos that appear on the receipt side for the first time in 1828. Such 
transfers also appear in every subsequent year for which there is budget data 
except 1834. These transfers are fairly substantial in 1831 and 1832, 1835, 
1838 (especially), 1839, and 1840. 129 
Consider now sales of state products to the public. Available figures 
indicate that in 1828 merchandise sales were five times larger than sales of 
agricultural products and livestock, the reverse of what was the case in 1820, 
when farm products outweighed merchandise sales 13 to 1. According to White's 
budget figures, in 1828, 1829, 1831, and 1832 merchandise sales exceeded sales 
of agricultural products and animals. There were no merchandise sales in 1833, 
but they resumed in 1834. From 1835 on, merchandise sales outstripped those of 
agricultural products and livestock every year. 130 Steel appeared as a 
46 
colonial period, were zero in 1828. Furthermore, revenues from domestic taxes 
accounted for only 30% of total government revenues. Most domestic tax 
revenues resulted from taxation in kind. The tithe, in particular, accounted 
for 86% of domestic tax revenues. On the other hand, over 60% of government 
revenues came from non-tax sources, rents of state lands and other property as 
well as sales of state products to the public and to troops. I will now 
examine these in greater detail, beginning with rents of state lands. 127 
a. Rents of State Lands. A list of ejido rentals for 1832 lists 160 
homestead, leased for a total of 395 pesos, or an average of 2.5 pesos each 
per year. A similar list for 1839 includes 174 homesteads leased for a total 
of 359 pesos, for an average of 2.1 pesos each. The numbers seem to suggest 
that the ejido rental rates were falling in the eighteen thirties but the 
number of observations is too small to conclude that they were, which would be 
consistent with what we know about the behavior of international trade. 128 
Reference has already been made to the transfers from mayordomos of 
pueblos that appear on the receipt side for the first time in 1828. Such 
transfers also appear in every subsequent year for which there is budget data 
except 1834. These transfers are fairly substantial in 1831 and 1832, 1835, 
1838 (especially), 1839, and 1840. 129 
Consider now sales of state products to the public. Available figures 
indicate that in 1828 merchandise sales were five times larger than sales of 
agricultural products and livestock, the reverse of what was the case in 1820, 
when farm products outweighed merchandise sales 13 to 1. According to White's 
budget figures, in 1828, 1829, 1831, and 1832 merchandise sales exceeded sales 
of agricultural products and animals. There were no merchandise sales in 1833, 
but they resumed in 1834. From 1835 on, merchandise sales outstripped those of 
agricultural products and livestock every year. 130 Steel appeared as a 
47 
separate item under SSPP in 1833, iron and medicines in 1835, to which 
"glassware and crockery" were added in 1837 and "salt" in 1839. "English 
linen" appeared as a new item in 1840. The merchandise in question was sold in 
state stores, of which there were as many as five or six in 1826. 131 
Francia created new taxes in the twenties, but seems to have abolished 
them in the thirties, as well as to have reduced the rates of taxes inherited 
from the colonial period, sometimes to zero. For example, the "derecho de 
ventaje t " according to White a tax on cattle brought for sale to Asunci6n t 
operated between 1823 and 1832, and a new tax on tanneries was created between 
1826 28. Francia also replaced the tithe by the "contribuci6n fructuaria de 
invierno y verano," lowered the alcabala (sales tax) from 4% to 2%, and 
abolished the "estanco" (a 3% tax on yerba according to White) in 1830. In 
1835 Francia further reduced the alcabala from 2% to 1% and the contribuci6n 
from 5% to 4%. In 1837, the contribuci6n de invierno was eliminated. 132 That 
the "derecho de ventaje" and the tax on tanneries were in force during a 
period roughly coincident with that of land confiscations and trade with 
Brazil may be significant, as may also be the fact that most tax reductions 
carne in the decade of the thirties t after the state's direct participation in 
production became significant, and that some of these changes coincided with a 
40% drop in prices observed between 1829 and 1832. 133 
These tax reductions have been interpreted as a fall in the tax burden, 
or as a tax decrease for the freeholder at the expense of slave labour.134 
In the first connection, notice that the diezmo was replaced by the 
contribuci6n fructuaria de invierno y verano after two yearly harvests again 
became the norm. Since the diezmo amounted to 10% of a single yearly harvest 
and the contribuci6n fructuaria was 5% of the summer and 5% of the winter 
cropst if the single crop amounted to about the same as the two yearly crops 
/ 
48 
put together, the transition from the diezmo to the contribuci6n need not have 
involved any fall in the physical amount of produce collected in kind from 
producers. On the contrary, provided the two harvests added up to more than 
the single crop had -ceteris paribus- the absolute amount of tax revenues 
collected by the government may have increased. The harvests of 1833 in fact 
seems to have been particularly good according to Wisner. 135 In such a case 
government auctioning of agricultural produce would have lowered its price. A 
government that anticipated this effect would try to keep grain off the 
market. The reduction in the rates of the contribuci6n fructuaria and the 
alcabala, therefore, may have been due to the fact that the physical amounts 
collected at the old rates were too high. In the second connection t it is 
clear that state coercion of labour increased. However, it is not clear that 
the peasantry's fiscal burden -defined as the ratio of peasants' tax 
contributions to income- decreased during the Francia years as compared to 
preceding years, even during the thirties. The tax burden may be said to have 
decreased only if the state had used surplus resources that would otherwise 
have remained unemployed to produce goods it would otherwise have had to 
finance through direct or indirect taxation. In this case both employment of 
resources and total output may be said to have increased t which clearly is not 
what happened in the period under study. To the extent that the state's 
economic role increased as a result of the expropriation of scarce resources 
that the private sector would have put to more efficient use, which is in fact 
what happened t the tax burden must be regarded as having increased. 
These data suggest that the state auctioned off confiscated assets as 
time went on. Once the stock of confiscated assets was depleted, state stores 
sold agricultural products and animals to the public, though they eventually 
engaged in the sale of imported foreign items at prices reflecting the 
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government's monopoly position as a foreign trade intermediary. That is, for 
the revenues yielded by taxes levied in kind over cattle and agricultural 
products, whose prices had fallen, the state substituted the profits from 
exports and from the sale of monopoly priced irnports. 136 
b. Government spending patterns during the late twenties and thirties 
were similar to that in evidence in earlier years, i.e., most government funds 
were devoted to the military. Table 2 gives available figures for military 
spending and troop strength. Military expenditures for all but one year of 
this period oscillated between 84 and 95 per cent of total government 
spending. In the one year for which they were below 80% (1934), they absorbed 
74% of total government spending. 
c. High military spending strained government finances to the point of 
seeming to drive government budget deficits. 137 As before these deficits 
were shored up by fines, forced contributions, and confiscations, which 
sometimes allowed the government budget to show a surplus. In 1829, 
confiscations amounted to 19,992 pesos. The government surplus was 14,503 
pesos.138 There were, however, years in which the government budget showed 
a surplus even though confiscations were minimal. In 1828, for example, 
confiscations were only 2573 pesos while the government budget surplus was 
45,449 pesos. However, the government budget surplus of 1828 seems to have 
been absorbed in 1829 by higher military expenditures and a reduction in tax 
139revenues. The deficit of 1833 appears to have elicited a reduction of 
military expenditures of slightly over a third in 1834, as well as renewed 
forced contributions. Had it not been for forced contributions, however, that 
year's government budget surplus would have been a deficit. In the following 
year, 1835, forced contributions were minimal, but state inheritance and 
confiscations from the Church rose again, though not enough to avert a 
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deficit. There is no government budget data for 1836 in secondary sources, but 
in 1837 nominal tax revenues amounted to about half of what they were in 1835 
in absolute terms, and to 8.87% of total government revenues (as opposed to 
almost 28% in 1835). Confiscations again accounted for 37.4% of total 
government revenues, forced contributions and state inheritance being 
negligible. Nevertheless, the deficit widened. 140 Two of the next three 
years were covert deficit years. That is, they would have been deficit years 
had not revenues from confiscations, state inheritance, forced contributions 
or another such forced exaction increased. In the third year, 1839, the 
deficit was overt. 
Section 5. Conclusions. 
The late colonial trade expansion did lead owners of abundant factors, 
and producers and exporters of goods using those factors intensively, to seek 
to advance their interests, that is, more representative governments as well 
as freer trade and federation, in a manner consistent with expectations 
derived from Rogowski's theoretical framework. However, federative efforts 
that, if successful, would have further expanded the gains from trade and 
promoted economic development predictably collapsed as a result of the free 
rider problem and the resulting collective action failure. The equally 
predictable trade blockades and threat of invasion in turn led to trade 
contraction, government fiscal crises, recession, and the rise of secessionist 
tendencies rooted in the small peasantry, themselves consistent with 
expectations derived from Rogowski's framework. Capitalizing on the consequent 
changes in relative strengths of political groups, political entrepreneurs 
came to power and enforced policies very different from those the movement for 
independence had initially advocated. Militarism, absolutism, and mercantilist 
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state regulation all increased subsequently, and the country plunged further 
into recession. However, the property rights distribution remained fairly much 
that of the late colonial period, though some alterations did take place 
affecting Spaniards and creoles from other provinces. The upshot of the decade 
of the 1810s' may be said to have been an absolutist restoration, in the 
political sphere in particular. 
The neocolonial order consolidated itself in the 1820s l through1 
political repressions, confiscations 1 and land expropriations by which the 
government sought to ameliorate its budgetary crises when foreign trade 
conditions improved. The property rights structure, consequently, suffered 
much more drastic alterations than in the previous decade, but the extent to 
which it became skewed towards the state should not be exaggerated. Though 
private property in land was seriously circumscribed l it did not disappear. In 
addition to owning much of the country's land, the state also became much more 
of a cattle rancher and a rent collecting landlord than it had been in the 
previous decade, much like its opponents had been and at their expense. 
Henceforth it would have a much bigger say in whether or not people became 
landlords. Furthermore, state interests took precedence over those of its 
purported supporters, the small peasantry. The few forms of political 
representation that had developed during the colonial period became fewer. The 
government thus obtained an economic base of its own much greater than it had 
ever possessed before, from which it could obtain tax revenues without 
consulting with contributors 1 representatives. In addition, its power to tax 
contributors without their consent also increased. The bulk of government 
revenues, before and after the confiscations, were devoted to assuring the 
Army's support, which was used to further decrease the government's domestic 
political competition, that iS I increase its monopoly position in the 
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political sphere, a fact that reflected itself in the rate of exchange of 
revenues for government services. Rule making power thus remained firmly in 
government hands, which exercised it without having to obtain the consent of 
the taxed. Consequently, the government could become more autonomous from that 
sector of the population which was largely responsible for originally bringing 
it to power, the small peasantry, as well as from bigger landlords, among whom 
opposition to the regime had always been stronger. 
Republican only nominally, this government lacked forms of popular 
representation that were commonplace in constitutional monarchies and 
eliminated some forms of representation that had been long standing features 
of the colonial period. Its political structure more closely resembled an 
absolute monarchy. Colonial absolutism, militarism, and mercantilist economic 
regulation persisted after independence and were exacerbated in the short 
run. 141 
However, the fact that the state may be regarded as autonomous does not 
mean that its economic policies achieved any sort of "autonomous development," 
as has been argued. The word autonomous suggests that external forces played 
no role in bringing about the changes that took place, which our preceding 
descriptions suggest was not the case. Moreover, the changes in property 
rights and political institutions that took place in the eighteen twenties, in 
particular, may be said to have constituted a veritable institutional 
regression. If we also consider the economy's performance between the 1810s 
and the 1830s, it is rather difficult to maintain that any "development" took 
place. Thus, the two words in the expression "autonomous development" simply 
should not be used together, perhaps should not be used at all, when speaking 
of Paraguay's economic performance under Francia. 
Similarly, the expression "state socialism," if it is intended to 
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suggest an early experiment with a more advanced form of social organization, 
is not applicable to Paraguay during the period at issue. The state during 
Francia's regime held extensive rights on land and regulated economic activity 
much like socialist economies did, and consequently resembled a socialist 
economy. In these respects, however, it mainly followed colonial precedent. In 
other words, there was path dependence. 142 Therefore, the period's political 
economic system considered as a whole is more appropriately characterized as 
neomercantilist and, therefore, conservative in nature. 143 
The institutional forms put in place by Francia persisted beyond his 
death in 1840 and waned only slowly over the long run. The absolutist state 
reaped great benefits from Rosas' defeat at Caseros and the subsequent opening 
of the Parana-Paraguay river system to free navigation. The ensuing export 
boom and associated economic expansion allowed the state to increase 
expenditures on the military and on the transportation and communication 
infrastructure, as well as on a "capital goods" industry, with a view to 
increasing exports and defending the gains from perceived foreign aggressors. 
A large share of the increased income accrued to the family that had corne to 
control the state at Francia's death, which therefore sought to perpetuate 
itself in power. 144 The dynasty, however, lasted for only two generations 
and was brought to an end by the Triple Alliance War. 
After 1870 militarism, absolutism, and mercantilism relinquished their 
hold only slowly. Although the Liberal Party rose to power in 1904, 
representative democracy and a laissez-faire economy did not take hold until 
the 1920's, and had a short life span; they did not survive the Great 
Depression and the Chaco War. 14S The February 1936 coup marked the beginning 
of the process that returned militarism, absolutism, and mercantilism to 
Paraguay until the late nineteen eighties. 146 Whether representative 
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democracy and a laissez-faire economy will prevail in Paraguay in the nineteen 
nineties is still an open question. If the experience of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century is any indication, past forms of political absolutism 
and economic mercantilism will hang on for dear life. Lessons derived from the 
study of past transitional periods may help lessen their grip, however. 
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Pena's books "make very interesting revelations and raise important and long-
neglected issues," even if they are "marred by a rather simplistic, all 
encompassing conspiratorial theory." See Benjamin Vargas Penal Secreta Politica, 
pp. 8-11, 49-64, and 93-124; R. Antonio Ramos, La politica del Brasil en el 
Paraguay bajo la dictadura del Dr. Francia (Buenos Aires, 1957); and Diego 
Abente, "The Liberal Republic and the Failure of Democracy," Journal of Latin 
American Studies Vol 21 (February 1989), p. 527. The subject clearly deserves 
more research. 
40. Yegros, for example. See Mariano Antonio Molas Descripci6n hist6rica de la 
antigua provincia del Paraguay 3a. edici6n (Buenos Aires, 1957). 
41.A summary of Velazquez's description of the broader aims of this Junta reads 
as follows: " .. ensenanza gratuita; instrucci6n para el maestro de primeras letras 
ajustada a las mas modernas concepciones pedag6gicas de la epoca, con citas que 
demuestran la gran versaci6n de sus autores y encaminada notoriamente a formar 
hombres libres y dignos; Sociedad Patri6tica Literaria, para coadyuvar a la 
elevaci6n del nivel cultural de la poblaci6n; Academia Militar, para la formaci6n 
de los mandos medios y subalternosj expedici6n al Norte, para expulsar a 
invasores portugueses; erecci6n del Cabildo de la Villa Real de la Concepci6n; 
trabajos iniciales de la fundaci6n de la Villa del Salvador de Taveg6 0 Eteveg6; 
supresi6n del tributo indigena; concesi6n para una linea de navegaci6n con buques 
a vapor .. ; relaciones cordiales con Artigas .. , como complemento 0 alternativa de 
las que se mantenian con Buenos Aires; y una misi6n confidencial para obtener el 
levantamiento del bloqueo realista del rio Parana ..Ademas se iniciaron gestiones 
para la adquisici6n en Buenos Aires de una imprenta y de la biblioteca que habia 
pertenecido a Mariano Moreno, entonces recientemente fallecido." See "Los 
Yegros", pp.59-60. 
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42.0n the agreement with Buenos Aires see Efraim Cardozo, "EI Plan Federal del 
Dr. Francia." (Buenos Aires, 1941). On the notion that technological innovations 
that reduce transportation costs are equivalent to tariff reductions see 
Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions. 
43.0n the agreement's dissolution see Cardozo, "Plan federal." I have highlighted 
only the main issues of contention between the Junta and Buenos Aires. 
44.Here I use the word "rational" in the neoclassical economic sense of 
"maximizing." The free rider concept is discussed at length in Olson's Logic. 
45.For late colonial export figures see Cooney, "Serving the Hinterland," p.84, 
for early national exports white, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution Appendices C 
through F, pps. 225-257. However, to calculate export values for the years in the 
period for which he did furnish data, White used 1818 prices of some goods and 
1829 prices of other goods. Thus, for those years he may in some sense be said 
to have furnished real rather than nominal figures, though not through deflating 
nominal figures by an index of export prices. In addition, White excluded goods 
exported in relatively small quantities, understating exports according to his 
own calculation by as much as 10 per cent. Subsequent authors t among them 
Whigham, Politics of River Trade, and Rebert Modernization From Within, have 
overlooked and compounded the problem by using White's figures to compile longer 
series for nominal exports and imports. White did not furnish export data for 
1810-1815, 1817, 1821-28, 1833-34, and 1836. Nor do his appendices contain import 
data for any year of the period. White's figures are used here only to gain an 
idea of the orders of magnitudes involved in the early national trade 
contraction. 
46.Tables 2 and 3 summarize data contained in White, Paraguay's Autonomous 
Revolution Appendix A, pp. 180-214. White arranged government income and 
expenditure categories differently every year, in order of decreasing magnitude. 
I have kept the yearly order of categories constant and allowed the magnitudes 
to vary. Note that White did not include data on government revenues and 
expenditures for 1817, 1819, 1821, 1824-27, 1830, and 1836, although on pp. 213­
214 he himself lists the ANA locations at which they are available. 
47.Tables 4 and 5 contain data in White, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, 
Appendix H. Data on troop strength and military allocations during this period 
also can be found in Williams, "From the Barrel". The findings of White and 
Williams, however, are sometimes at odds. For example t Williams warns that the 
Libros de Caxa of the War Treasury between 1816 and 1827 "concerns troops 
garrisoned in and around the capital. Frontier troops and the garrisons of other 
population centers such as pilar and Ytapua, are not mentioned in the libros de 
Caxa." These were expected to be self sufficient. See Williams, "From the 
Barrel", p.77. White, however, in Paraguayts Autonomous Revolution, suggest that 
these data apply to the country as a whole. Proper hypothesis testing procedure 
require that I use White's figures, because they may be underestimates of true 
values on troop strength and military allocations. They also cover a wider period 
(between 1816 and 1823). However t I will use White's figures to suggest the 
orders of magnitude involved only. Where possible, I will supplement White's 
figures with those of Williams' and other sources. Again, this procedure may be 
questionable, but not if the purpose is to suggest orders of magnitude. 
48.Just as the reforms of 1801 may be said to have given origin to the early 
Paraguayan military, measures by Governor Velazco -his requisition of "a number 
of merchant ships in the Asuncion harbor"- may be said to have given rise to the 
Paraguayan Navy. These ships "were armed, many of them with cannon," and were 
devoted to the expedition against Corrientes in 1811 and to patrolling the 
Parana. However, and despite the riverain blockades imposed by Buenos Aires 
beginning in 1812, "little was done to strengthen the flotilla for several years" 
according to Williams, "From the Barrel", p.84. 
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49.White, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, p.104. Government budgets show that 
the government spent funds for "construction of ships" in 1816 and 1818, pesos 
8,551 and 6,622, respectively. See White, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution pps. 
182 and 184. This is consistent with the fact that a Paraguayan naval force 
bombarded Corrientes in 1818, in retaliation for the earlier seizure of several 
Paraguayan merchant ships. Expenditures on shipbuilding continued in 1819 and 
1820, when the government respectively devoted 10,724 pesos (Williams, "From the 
Barrel", p.84) and 13,615 pesos (White, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, p.186) 
to that aim. The flotilla was augmented by the addition of captured ships in 
1820. The disaffected crew of a heavily armed ship belonging to Littoral caudillo 
Francisco Ramirez interned at Pilar and gave itself up. Francia refused to 
release the ship. See Williams, "From the Barrel", p. 84 and 85. 
50.Though total government receipts increased from 264,000 pesos in 1816 to 
286,000 pesos in 1818. See White, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, App. A. 
51.Tax revenues decreased by 72,000 pesos, confiscations amounted to 90,107 
pesos, and the 1818 budget surplus to 91,712. See White, Paraguay's autonomous 
Revolution, Appendix A. 
52.They fell from 47,770 pesos to 8,146 pesos, a drop of 83%. Excise taxes also 
fell, but not in the same proportion, from 40,285 to 33,445 pesos. See White, 
Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, Appendix A. 
53.Which amounted to 7,729 pesos. Merchandise sales amounted to only 650 pesos. 
See White, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, Appendix A. 
54.They amount to less than 5,000 pesos. See White, Paraguay's Autonomous 
Revolution, Appendix A. 
55. The officers probably were much better educated and more familiar with their 
Buenos Aires counterparts and their innovative ideas than revisionist and 
nationalist historians have generally been willing to concede. The secondary 
literature alone suggests as much. See, for example, Chaves, La revolucion; 
Sanchez Quell, Pedro Juan Caballero, and Velazquez, "Los Yegros". The Congress 
of 1814 was supposed to have had 1000 delegates, though only six or seven hundred 
attended. That of 1816 had only 150 delegates. See Chaves, EI Supremo Dictador 
(1958, pp. 168 and 182). Seven eights of the votes from the countryside favored 
Francia in the 1814 Congress. The 1816 Congress, however, designated Francia 
Perpetual Dictator and "ser sin exemplar," by acclamation, without a vote. See 
Francisco Wisner de Morgenstern, EI Dictador del Paraguay. Jose Gaspar de Francia 
(Buenos Aires, 1923, 1957), pp. 76, 90, respectively. 
56.Matiauda at Itapua joined Artigas. See Williams, The Rise and Fall, p.39. 
Caballero is reported to have helped convince the Congress of 1814 of the need 
to give Francia dictatorial powers for a limited term. See Cooney, "The 
Paraguayan Independence Movement". For Francia's Army reorganization decree see 
ANA, Seccion Historia, Vol. 229, N. 11, transcribed in Alfredo Viola, Cartas y 
Decretos del Dictator Francia, tomo III (Asuncion, 1990), pp. 26-29. For the 
"Great Conspiracy" see Williams, "The Conspiracy of 1820 and the Destruction of 
the Paraguayan Aristocracy." Revista de Historia de America nos. 75-76 (Jan-Dec 
1973) :141-156. 
57.Something similar had happened in Paraguay during the Comuneros Revolt at the 
end of the first third of the eighteenth century. Theft and crime continued to 
be a preoccupation of provincial governors and of the consuls (See Garavaglia, 
Economia, sociedad y regiones, pp. 243-45). Should an alliance with Artigas be 
formed, therefore, the possibility of a recurrence could not be discounted. 
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58.The literature on the 1820's frequently refers to budgetary problems, 
government efforts to improve international trade, and land confiscations, but 
does not causally connect them to one another or to the increased labor coercion 
that can be found in this period. For a recent example see Thomas L. Whigham, 
"The Backdoor Approach: The Alto Uruguay and Paraguayan Trade, 1810-1852" Revista 
de Historia de America n° 109 (Enero-Junio 1990) :45-68. 
59.Tax revenues fell by 14,336 pesos, 6-7% of 1816 receipts; confiscations 
amounted to 121,123 pesos, 35-40% larger in nominal terms than those of 1818. See 
White, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, Appendix A. 
60.Government spending fell by 28,218 pesos and the budget deficit was 38,000 
pesos. 
61.Brazil offered to establish commercial relations with Paraguay on February 
1st., 1823. Buenos Aires, likewise, proposed to reestablish commercial and 
economic relations several times during the period stretching from November 1823 
to November 1824, and relaxed the blockade. See White, Paraguay/s Autonomous 
Revolution, p.179. 
62.Quoted in White, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, p.140. 
63.See Vargas Pefia on Parish's message to Francia concerning Buenos Aires' 
attitude regarding trade at this point. 
64.The quote comes from White, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, p.140. 
65.ANA-SH, Legajo 241, Francia a Ramirez, December 22, 1831, cited in White, 
Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, p. 147. 
66.Rengger and Longchamps furnish evidence that Francia had a different attitude 
towards trade with Brazil and with Argentina. They observe that (t)he price ofII 
flour having risen in 1821, the Dictator fixed a maximum for its sale, which was 
lower than the price paid for it at Buenos Ayres; the year following he did the 
same thing with the cattle brought to be slaughtered. On the other hand, when he 
opened a commercial relation with the Portuguese, he fixed a minimum, under which 
the tobacco and tea of Paraguay were not allowed to be sold." See Rengger, J.R. 
and M. Longchamps, The Reign of Doctor Joseph Gaspard Roderick de Francia in 
Paraguay; Being an Account of a Six Year's Residence in that Republic, from July, 
1819-to May 1825 (London, 1827), 
p.151. Italics in original, MP. 
67.Rengger and Longchmaps' observations suggest that the preferential trade 
conditions Paraguay accorded Brazil may have actually benefited Argentina and 
that Corrientes, in particular, gained substantially from the fact that it did 
not have to contend with Asuncion's competition in downriver markets for yerba 
mate and other products. They remark that "(i)n 1819, Corrientes was half in 
ruins, and looked more like a deserted village than an inhabited city. In 1825, 
we found the old houses rebuilt and a great number of new ones erected. The 
population had considerably increased, commerce was in full activity, and 
agriculture flourishing" While admitting that part of the recovery was due to the 
four years of peace enjoyed since 1821, they also observe that "(t)his city, 
moreover, owes, in part, its speedy re-establishment to the interruption of the 
trade with ParaguaYi for since the, its inhabitants gave themselves up 
exclusively to the cultivation of tobacco, and the sugar-cane, and to the felling 
of wood for building-branches of industry, in which it would have been before 
impossible for them to have competed with their neighbours. Rengger and 
Longchamps, Reign of Doctor Francia, p.195, bottom.d 
I 
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68.John Lynch, "The Origins of Spanish American Independence," in Leslie Bethell 
(editor) Cambridge History of Latin America (London, 1987), p.333, emphasis in 
the original. Francia's strong preference for Brazil did not restrict itself to 
the realm of trade and may only partially be attributed to his Portuguese 
background. It may not be unreasonable to suggest that it may have been due to 
his conservative political views. 
69.See John Hoyt Williams, "La guerra no-declarada entre el Paraguay y 
Corrientes," Estudios Paraguayos vol 1, n01 (Noviembre 1973) :35-43. 
70.0n Grandsire's projects and Francia's attitude towards them see Juan Francisco 
Perez Acosta, Francia y Bompland (Buenos Aires, 1942), pp.25-27. 
71.Francia's first decree, of 13 November 1814, is quoted in Cecilio Baez, 
Ensayo sobre el Doctor Francia y la dictadura en Sud-America (Asuncion, 1910), 
p.93. Baez also paraphrases the contents of the second decree, which dates from 
the mid twenties. 
72.Alfredo Viola mentions some of the ingenious ways in which individuals sought 
to smuggle money out and the mulcts that were applied to individuals who were 
caught in the act. See "Moneda y control de cambio durante el gobierno del Dr. 
Francia," Anuario del Instituto de Investigaciones Historicas Jose Gaspar 
Rodriguez de Francia Vol III, n° 3 (Setiembre), pp. 15 and 16. For the decree 
concerning silversmithing establishments see Circu1ar a los Comisionados de Costa 
Abajo, 21-abril-1929, ANA-SH Vol 240, n02, also cited in Viola, "Moneda y control 
de cambio", p. 15. 
73.The "escapae valve" view, though evidently untenable, has remained popular in 
the literature. Even writers who have abandoned the dependentista school still 
cling to it. Thus, Whigham's Politics of River Trade still speaks of a 
"commercial 'vent''', p. 40. 
74.Squatters who had settled on the lands were expelled. See Alfredo Viola, "La 
tenencia de la tierra durante el gobierno del Dr. Francia," Anuario del Instituto 
de Investigaciones Historicas Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia Vol. II, n° 2 
(November) :80-89. 
7s.Most of those found guilty of conspiracy were executed on July 17, 1821. 
Molas claims, according to White, that sixty eight were executed. White himself 
claims that twenty one were executed on July 17 or shortly thereafter, and that 
a total of at most forty political executions took place during Francia's entire 
tenure. See Mariano Antonio Molas, "Clamor de un Paraguayo,1I Revista del Paraguay 
n 07 @ 8 (1828, 1893) :240-262, cited in White, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, 
p. 91 bottom, and White, ibid., p. 92, respectively. For the "autos" and the 
assets 	confiscated from Cavanas, the Yegros and the Montiel families see Williams 
(1973a) p. 151. 
76.0n the Colegio's closure see John Hoyt Williams, "Dictatorship and the Church: 
Dr. Francia in Paraguay." Journal of Church and State Vol. 15, n03 (Fall 1973), 
p. 430, and White, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, p. 279, footnote 72). 
77.For the secularization decree see Carlos Pastore, La lucha oor la tierra en 
el Paraguay (Montevideo: 1972), p.99; and Williams, IIDictatorship and the 
Church," p.430-31. For partial studies of inventories of convents see Jerry W. 
Cooney, "The Destruction of the Religious Orders in Paraguay," The Americas Vol. 
36, n02 (October) :177-198, and Williams, "Dictatorship and the Church". The quote 
is from Williams, "Dictatorship", p. 431. For the transformation of conventual 
buildings into barracks see Alberto Nogues La Iglesia en la epoca del Dr. Francia 
(Asuncion, 1960), p.s, paraphrased in Williams, IIDictatorship and the Church", 
77 
p. 431. 
78.0ne of the better reputed analyses of the evolution of Paraguay's land tenure 
system available to date states in this connection that: "Las tierras privadas 
cuyos propietarios no pudieron presentar los titulos 0 certificados en el plazo 
determinado por el gobierno, fueron arrendadas a sus ocupantes, sus primitivos 
duenos, con la obligacion de cultivarlas y poblarlas de ganado, convirtiendose 
asi en importante fuente financiera del Estado. El gobierno, por su parte, ocupo 
las tierras aptas para la produccion ganadera, organizando en elIas grandes 
estancias de ganado vacuno y caballar del Estado, para abastecer de carne, 
montados y equipos al ejercito, y de cueros a la industria de la curtiembre y de 
la yerba mate, y para distribuir entre la gente sin recursos economicos." See 
Pastore, Lucha por la tierra, p.l02. 
79.See Alfredo Viola I "Tenencia de la tierra," pp. 85-86. Francia's decree says: 
" .. la omision de los mercedarios ha sido la causa no solo de hallarse atin 
despobladas dichas villas y sus costas y de los desastres y robos que por falta 
de suficiente gente que la cubra y defienda han ejecutado los indios barbaros del 
Chaco sino tambien de que para contenerlos haya sido preciso que el govierno conl 
crecidos gastos hiciese construir cuatro fuertes en aquella banda, manteniendo 
en todos ellos la guarnicion de tropa veterana a costa igualmente de lal 
Tesoreria, sin que hubiesen bastado, para que los insinuados mercedarios 
cumpliesen con su obligacion las repetidas providencias, que en todo tiempo aun 
en el antiguo regimen se tomaron para que poblasen ~ebidamente las tierras que 
habian soliciatado y se les habia concedido .. " Viola adds that "Dispuso ademas 
el Dictador que si esas tierras no era pobladas por el termino senalado se 
tendran ' ... por invalidas e ineficaces, mandandolas recoger, y se repartieran las 
tierras a las familias pobres que se iran remitiendo a poblar la costa. I " See 
Viola, "Tenencia de la Tierra", pp. 85-86. 
80.The information on state ranches "Costa Arriba" and "Costa Abajo" is from 
Viola l "Tenencia de la tierra". 
81.See John Hoyt Williams, "Paraguay/s Nineteenth Century Estancias de la 
Republica," Agricultural History Vol. 47 (July) :206-215). 
82.See Archivo Nacional, Vol 61, n021-37 SEI in Coleccion Doroteo Bareiro l Tomo 
III, p. 151 in Coleccion Documental Carlos A. Pastore. 
83.See Luis Armando Galeano Romero I "Unidades productivas agropecuarias y 
estructura de poder en Paraguay (1811-1870)/" Revista Paraguaya de Sociologia 
Vol. 9, n° 23 (Enero-Abril) :91-105, and White, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, 
p. 264. 
84.Riquelme Garcia states that "por la pragmatica de expulsion de los jesuitas 
el 7 de febrero de 1767 se dispuso que todos los bienes de la Compania de Jesus 
en Hispanoamerica l pasasen a ser aplicados a la fundacion de institutos de 
ensenanza", and goes on to say that "se entrego al Seminario , en enero de 1781 1 
las estancias de Paraguari, Tacuruti, Ybitipe, Yeguariza, Caanabe, Pindapoita, 
Yariguaa-mini, Roman Potrero, Guazu-cua, Yariguaa-guazu, Roman Potrero viejo, 
Novillo Vacay, La Cruz, treinta y cinco leguas de tierras en las Cordilleras, 
tierras de labrantios en Tacumbu, las chacras de San Lorenzo, Barsequillo Potrero 
y Capiipery." See Benigno Riquelme Garcia, "El Colegio Seminario Conciliar de San 
Carlos, de Asuncion, 1783-1822," CUadernos Republicanos nOl0 1 p. 74. Juan 
Bautista Rivarola Paoli furnishes a roughly coincident list of sixteen ranches. 
See "La Administracion de Temporalidades en la Provincia del Paraguay," Historia 
,I 
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Paraguaya Vol. 25 (1988), p. 200. This number is also that furnished by a 
contemporary observer, Mariano Antonio Molas, in "Descripci6n hist6rica de la 
antigua Provincia del Paraguay," Revista de Buenos Aires Tomo IX (1866), p. 187, 
cited by Pastore, Lucha por la tierra, p. 104. Ranches administered by the 
Colegio in the Paraguary "partido" in 1816, are said to have been Tacuruty and 
Caacupe, suggesting that, by that date, the number of ranches could have been 
larger still, ceteris paribus. See "Ynventario Perteneciente a las Estancias de 
Paraguary," Archivo Nacional, Vol. 1822, NE, 20 July 1816. For the statement that 
former Jesuit ranches were turned to individuals see Rengger and Longchamps, 
Reign of Doctor Francia. 
85.Beeves from state ranches were not only used to feed the troops. In addition, 
evidence from 1829 reportedly suggests that the state distributed eight hundred 
head of cattle to the indigent poor of Villa Rica. Evidence from 1831 suggests 
that the state provided beeves in partial payment of the salaries of eight 
teachers of rural public schools. See Williams, "Estancias de la Republica", 
p.211. This is consistent with the notion that after the state expropriated the 
lands of the religious orders, it had to take over some welfare functions that 
the Church had discharged during the colonial and the early national period, like 
those related to ministering to the needy and education. 
86.Available evidence indicates that the government obtained revenues from 
renting out ejido lands after 1827. See White, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, 
p. 278, footnote 71. It is not clear whether these ejido lands belonged to 
Spanish or Indian towns. 
S7.See Williams, "From the Barrel of a Gun". 
SS.See velazquez, "Los Yegros", p. 60. The passage referred to reads in its 
entirety as follows: "Hubo conspiraci6n en 1820? Pudo haberla, como no haberla. 
El propio gobernador afectado se habria encargado de destruir la documentaci6n 
relativa al tema. Sabre el mismo existe amplia bibliografia, can aseveraciones 
y desmentidos por igual rotundos, mas no hallamos en ella testimonios objetivos 
que nos permitan arribar a definitiva certidumbre." 
89.See previously quoted excerpt from Batou, Cent ans. 
90.The claim that Francia's emphytheusis was simply a prolongation of the 
colonial emphytheusis, made by Baez, Ensayo sabre el Dr. Francia, is restated by 
Abente, IIForeign Capital", p. 73. 
91.See Castedo Franco, "Proceso social de la revoluci6n." 
92.For the emphyteusis under Rodriguez and Rivadavia see Emilio Coni, La verdad 
sabre la enfiteusis de Rivadavia (Buenos Aires, 1927), Sergio Bagu, EI plan 
econ6mico del grupo rivadaviano, 1811-1827 (Rosario, Argentina, 1966), pp.49-53 
and 84-94) and Miron Burgin, The Economic Aspects of Argentine Federalism, 1S20­
1852 (New York, 1946), pp. 96-99. 
93.In that sense they also seem to have differed from the emphyteusis Carlos 
Antonio Lopez's later implemented, as described by Gelly. See Juan Andres Gelly, 
Paraguay: 10 que fue, 10 que es, y 10 que sera (Paris, 1926). 
94.The Army could press peasants into service. Pirvate ranchers, presumably, 
could not obtain laborers in that fashion. State ranches, therefore, had an 
advantage vis-a-vis private ranches. 
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108.Whigham, The Politics of River Trade, p. 29, advances a similar opinion, but 
offers no evidence to support it. 
109.See Burgin, Economic Aspects of Argentine Federalism, p.97, emphasis in the 
original. 
110.For early modern Europe see Ronald Batchelder and Herman Freudenberger, "On 
the Rational Origins of the Modern Centralized State," Explorations in Economic 
History Vol. 20 (1983), pp. 1-13, for seventeenth century England see North and 
Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment". 
111.Viola points out that "educational expenditures limited themselves to paying 
the salaries of the elementary school teacher of Asuncion, Jose Gabriel Tellez, 
the professors of the Colegio Seminario de San Carlos which opened until 1823, 
and of the academy of young apprentices." After the Colegio's closure, 
educational expenditures must have fallen, but according to Viola they 
"experienced a noticeable increase beginning in 1834." See Alfredo Viola, "El Dr. 
Francia y la Hacienda Publica," Anuario del Instituto de Investigaciones 
Historicas Dr. Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia Vol V, n° 5 (October 1983), p.53. 
Potthast-Jukheit notes that Francia's policies had the effect of "weakening the 
institution of marriage," and illegitimacy rose, in Encarnacion, "from around 51% 
in 1818 and 1819" to more than 79% in 1835/36, and in Villa Rica, Horqueta, and 
Santa Rosa to 54%, 50%, and 35%, respectively. See Potthast-Jukheit, "Ass of a 
Mare", p.220. 
112.See Cooney, "Repression and Reform", p.416. 
113.See Fulgencio Yegros, Pedro Juan Cavallero, and Fernando de la Mora, 9 de 
abril de 1812, in Baez, Ensayo sobre el Doctor Francia, pp.87-88. 
114.The original reads "casarse con indias de los pueblos, mulatas conocidas, y 
negras." Viola's remark may b found in Alfredo Viola, "El Dr. Francia y la 
Hacienda Publica," Anuario del Instituto de Investigaciones Historicas Dr. Jose 
Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia Vol V, n° 5 (October), p. 49. On Francia's extension 
of the droit d'aubaine see Barbara Potthast-Jutkeit, "The Ass of a Mare and Other 
Sancals: Marriage and Extramarital Relations in Nineteenth Century Paraguay," 
Journal of Family History, Vol 16 n03 (1991), p.219. 
115.The decree granting one such license reads as follows: "Asuncion y Noviembre 
1° de 1819. Se concede licencia para el Matrimonio, que pretende esta parte, 
siempre que entregue en la Tesoreria tres mil ochocientos pesos fuertes para los 
gastos extraordinarios del Estado, que al presente occuren en la inteligencia de 
que verificada la entrega se dara por el Actuario el correspondiente certificado 
de esta concesion. Francia. Ante mi Mateo Fleytas, Fiel de Fhos." Archivo 
Nacional, Vol 2533, Nueva Encuadernacion, transcribed in Coleccon Doroteo 
Bareiro, tomo III, p.48, in Coleccion Documental Carlos A. Pastore. 
116.See Carlos Antonio Heyn Schupp, Iglesia y Estado en el proceso de 
emancipacion politica del Paraguay (1811-1853) (Asuncion: 1991) p. 212. 
117.The entire passage reads as follows: 
"por hallarme en un pais de pura gente idiota, donde el Gobierno no tiene 
a quien volver los ojos, siendo preciso que yo 10 haga, 10 industrie y 10 
amaestre todo por sacar al Paraguay de la infelicidad y abatimiento en que 
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